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1. Introduction 
Energy is essential for all countries as it is needed for growth and development. Hereunder, 
oil and gas are seen as some of the essential resources. However, the reserves of oil and 
natural gas are not evenly distributed throughout the world. Some countries have vast reserves 
while most countries are dependent on imports to cover their energy needs. Proedrou (2012) 
points out that “[d]isruptions in energy supplies inflict grave concerns for growth, 
development, sustainability and survival” and this is why energy security is central in global 
politics (p. 3). Energy security for importers entails security of supply, that is, stable and 
continued access to energy resources. It also includes an aim of having diversified sources of 
supply, suppliers and routes of supply so as to avoid consequences of being too dependent on 
one source (Proedrou, 2012, p. 3).  
The thesis will deal with natural gas and not oil, as gas is a regional market, while oil 
is more global. This is because gas trade is mostly bound to pipelines whilst oil is shipped out 
through tankers across the globe, which creates more limitations on importers’ and exporters’ 
options in gas trade (Proedrou, 2012, p. 54). Gas can also be transported as Liquefied Natural 
Gas (LNG). LNG is natural gas which has been cooled and pressurised to a liquid state. It can 
then be transported on LNG carriers, and is not dependent on pipeline infrastructure. The 
greatest disadvantage is that for large volumes, it is more expensive to transform the gas to 
LNG and carry it by ship than it is to transport it through pipelines (Norsk Petroleum, 2015b). 
Pipeline trade cultivates an environment for mutual dependence, rather than diversification 
and flexibility. It is therefore harder to achieve diversification of gas rather than oil. If there 
are any shortages in gas supply, these are difficult to make up for, as there are few alternative 
sources (Proedrou, 2012, p. 54). 
The European Union (EU) is dependent on importing natural gas to cover its 
consumption, and more than half of its 480 billion cubic meters (bcm)1 consumption of 
natural gas per year is imported. Currently, about 66% of the consumption comes from 
imports (European Commission, 2014b, pp. 5, 37). As the internal production is on the 
decline, the EU will be even more dependent on imports in the future, though there are vastly 
diverse states of import dependency among the EU member states and thus, variations in their 
degree of reliance on suppliers. Therefore, the EU does not want to be too dependent on one 
                                                          
1 Natural gas is measured in different units in different sources, but in this thesis measures are converted to 
bcm. 
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supplier, and as a result, the diversification of gas supplies has risen high up on the EU’s 
agenda.  
Russia and Norway are the EU’s two biggest suppliers of natural gas. In 2012, 32% of 
the EU’s imports of natural gas came from Russia, and Norwegian gas covered 31% of 
imports (European Commission, 2014b, p. 44, 2015e). The bilateral relationships between the 
EU and the two countries are quite different. The EU’s relationship with Russia in the gas 
sector has not been as stable as its partnership with Norway. Russia has proven that it is 
willing to use its natural gas resources and standing as main supplier of gas to the EU as a tool 
in its foreign policy. This was seen with the 2006 and 2009 gas crises, when a dispute 
between Russia and Ukraine led to Russia halting gas supplies that transited the country, an 
action that had a profound impact on many European countries. Especially the 2009 gas crisis 
affected most European countries which imported Russian gas, but the damaging effects were 
more severe in the countries which were heavily, or solely, reliant on Russian imports 
(Hadfield, 2012, pp. 454-458). The current conflict in Ukraine has further highlighted Russia 
as an unreliable supplier and Ukraine as a problematic transit state. Norway, on the other 
hand, is considered by the EU as a safe supplier that does not require much investment 
(Offerdal, 2010, p. 39). 
 
1.1. Research question 
Norway is the second largest supplier of natural gas to the EU. At a time when the EU is 
looking to diversify its supplies away from Russia to enhance its security of supply, this thesis 
will examine Norway’s role as a supplier of natural gas to the EU. The focus will be on gas as 
there are vast differences among the EU member states in regards to energy, and especially 
concerning natural gas. First of all, the member states have very different energy mixes. For 
some states, natural gas makes up over 30% of their energy mix, while others do not consume 
any natural gas, like Malta and Cyprus (see Appendix A). The member states also have 
differing states of import dependency, and degrees of diversification of sources, transit routes, 
and suppliers. There are vastly varying degrees of import dependence on Russia as a supplier 
(see Appendix B). Some member states are highly dependent on Russia, and are therefore 
very vulnerable to supply disruptions. Some, on the other hand, have diversified transit routes 
and suppliers of natural gas. This has made energy supply policy difficult to agree on, as 
measures will not fit every member state’s interests and needs.  
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The gas crises of 2006 and 2009, revealed Russia as an unreliable supplier and 
Ukraine as an unreliable transit state. As the crises had profound implications for several 
European countries, they exposed the EU’s lack of supplier diversification and infrastructure, 
especially in Central, Southern and Eastern Europe (Hadfield, 2012, p. 457). This has made 
the EU focus on diversification of supplies and on improving infrastructure so that an 
eventual future disruption would not have such far-reaching consequences.  
The thesis examines how the EU regards Norway as a supplier based on its 
relationship with Russia in the natural gas field. Thus, it is based on the following research 
question: 
What is Norway’s role in reducing European Union dependency on Russian natural 
 gas? 
To account for the EU’s relationship with Norway, it will be necessary to take a 
historical look at how this relationship has evolved, and this is examined in chapter three. 
However, the main focus will be on the situation today and developments in the years to 
come. To be able to answer the research question, it will be essential to examine the EU’s 
need for gas imports, that is, how much of its consumption it is necessary to import currently 
and in the years to come. This will be evaluated in chapter two. It will also be necessary to 
look at how the EU’s dependence on Russian gas has influenced its energy policies, and what 
progress the EU has made in the field of energy policy. The thesis will argue that Russia is a 
less than reliable supplier, in light of its willingness to use gas supplies for political means. 
This has affected how the EU regards its suppliers, and caused it to focus on diversification so 
that it will not be as vulnerable to such changes or external situations that can affect the 
supply of gas. Norway, contrary to Russia, is considered a reliable supplier of gas, and its 
relationship with the EU has been predictable and stable. 
The analysis will examine three sub-question to provide answers to the research 
question. Firstly, it will assess whether it would be in Norway’s interests to export more 
natural gas to the EU. Secondly, it will examine whether Norway could have an increasing 
role in the EU’s imports of gas. Here, Norway’s potential for future production and exports 
are explored. Thirdly, it will be analysed whether it would be in the EU’s interests to import 
more natural gas from Norway, and hereunder, whether it would be along the lines of EU 
policies in the energy field. Further, the chapter examines what obstacles there are in regards 
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to policy-making in the natural gas field, and thus what hinders the EU faces in dealing with 
its suppliers of natural gas.  
 
1.2. Previous research 
There is much previous research on the EU and security of gas supply, hereunder much on the 
EU’s relationship with Russia. From the previous research on the EU and energy security two 
main categories have emerged. The first group is the authors who argue that Russia not only 
is, but will increasingly be, the dominant supplier of gas to the EU. These authors focus on the 
differences between the two actors, especially their differing preferences concerning gas 
pipelines, how to best resolve these issues or work around them, and they conclude that 
Russia will nonetheless be the dominant supplier. The second category, which also is the 
group which comprises more of the literature, focuses on the importance of supply 
diversification. These authors tend to argue that Russia is, and will be, an important supplier 
of gas, but that it is necessary for the EU to diversify its supply to increase energy security.  
Baev (2012) is placed in the first category as he argues that in spite of the EU’s focus 
on liberalization and diversification, Russia will remain locked in the European gas market 
and will therefore remain its main supplier. He further argues that Russia’s share on the 
market will in all likelihood increase in the future as the EU‘s need for gas imports is 
increasing. Noreng (2009) also fits into the first category. He claims that despite substantial 
investments, nuclear power and new energy sources will only be able to moderate the trend of 
energy dependence, not change it. He states that the EU needs an independent economic and 
political strategy towards its energy neighbours, and hereunder Russia, which aims at building 
interdependence in order to give preferential access to energy supplies. 
Paillard (2010) fits into the second category as he argues that the EU must diversify its 
energy supplies, find new suppliers, develop its own industries, and avoid too much 
dependence on Russia. For this last point he argues that this can be done through pursuing an 
alternative supplier, such as further developing the relationship with Norway. He claims that 
Russia will remain a necessary partner for the EU and that they must rely on each other for 
several decades, but his main conclusion is on the importance of diversification. He also states 
that the EU must be able to find some common ground between its member states to enable it 
to speak in a unified voice so that it can strengthen its position vis-à-vis Russia. Such a 
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development might currently be underway with the energy union which was proposed this 
year. This will be presented further in chapter two. 
The Congressional Research Service’s report by Ratner, Belkin, Nichol and Woehrel 
(2013) also fits into the second category as it focuses on the different approaches Europe 
could adopt to achieve greater gas supply diversification. It also looks at Russia’s role in 
Europe’s natural gas policies, and aspects that could hinder efforts to develop alternative 
suppliers of natural gas. The report looks at the potential suppliers of natural gas to the EU 
and what needs to be overcome in order for them to become long-term suppliers. The authors 
also point out that the Barents Sea holds potential to become a new European energy region, 
and that Norway has already started producing natural gas in the region. Bahgat (2006) is 
another author that can be put in the second category. He discusses the difficulties with the 
EU’s relationship with Russia, and concludes that increased supplies from Russia, the Caspian 
Sea region, West Africa and especially the Middle East would reduce the EU’s vulnerability 
with being too dependent on one source. 
There is a range of previous research which does not fit into these two categories. 
Hereunder, the article by Söderbergh, Jakobsson and Aleklett (2009) looks at the future of 
Norwegian natural gas production. They conclude that there is only a limited potential for 
increased gas exports from Norway to the EU as Norwegian gas production will reach its peak 
by 2015. The article has valuable insights for this thesis, but it was written before the treaty on 
maritime delimitation in the Barents Sea between Russia and Norway in 2010, and therefore 
does not contain the present facts. Thus, according to current estimates for Norwegian natural 
gas production, these authors are not correct. The article by Kristine Offerdal (2010) has its 
main focus on whether Norway has been able to have an impact on the EU’s processes to 
develop an Energy Policy for Europe. She offers valuable insights into how the relationship 
has been between the EU and Norway as she looks at the developments of Norway’s High 
North policy and the EU’s energy policy and its mentions of the High North. A reason for the 
EU’s lack of interest, she argues, is that since there have been no problems with Norway, the 
EU has the impression that it is not necessary to invest a lot as “Norway will make sure that 
developments go in the desired direction, independent of EU engagement” (Offerdal, 2010, p. 
39). She further argues that Norway is an important supplier of gas and a part of the solution 
to the EU’s energy supply challenge, but that on the EU’s part it is viewed an already existing 
solution and not in need of much investment, and that the High North is not viewed by the EU 
as an energy region to rely on in the foreseeable future.  
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Ole Gunnar Austvik (2010) discusses in his chapter to which degree a powerful 
interventionist policy of a nation-state can be adjusted to the EU’s more liberal way of 
regulating economic activities, while at the same time maintaining nationally defined goals. 
He uses Norway’s integration with the EU and the impacts it had on the strong state policy in 
the petroleum sector as an illustration. He concludes that the state gained a more regulative 
than interventionist role caused by the integration, but that it is also owing to industrial and 
market maturity. In an article, Austvik (2012) discusses the Norwegian state’s role in 
developing and maintaining its national oil and gas industry. He argues that a strong, 
comprehensive, and dynamic interaction between the state and industry, with the state in a 
leading role, may be necessary to ensure that the industry is competitively developed and that 
social goals can be reached. 
Tom Casier (2011) is another author that does not fit into either of the categories. He 
looks at the reasons for why energy has risen to the top of the EU-Russia agenda and is 
considered a security threat, and thereby offers insight into the development of the energy 
relationship between Russia and the EU. Youngs (2011) examines what progress the EU has 
made in establishing a common energy policy, and concludes that the member states at 
present seem content with the current system. Eikeland (2011) discusses the EU’s efforts in 
establishing  the internal energy market. Grätz (2011) examines the EU’s external energy 
policy towards Russia, and concludes that this has failed to a great extent because of the EU 
member states pursuing different approaches. Alexander Rahr (2007) and Michael Sander 
(2007) discuss if there is a special relationship between Germany and Russia, and Rahr 
concludes that “[t]he Russia factor will continue to split the EU” (p. 145). Stefanova (2012) 
discusses the EU’s strategies for achieving greater energy security. She argues that while 
some efforts might seem contradictory, such as building pipelines for Russian gas to avoid 
risky transit states versus building pipelines to avoid Russian gas supplies, they contribute to 
enhance the EU’s energy security. The book by Proedrou (2012) examines the EU’s energy 
security in the gas sector and the challenges and opportunities facing it. He also looks at the 
EU’s relationship with producers other than Russia, hereunder Norway as well. Here, he 
mentions that estimates for future production capacity vary significantly, but that the High 
North is a very promising region. He also underlines that Norway will continue to be an 
essential gas supplier for the EU (Proedrou, 2012, pp. 108-109). 
There are many authors that focus on the EU and the challenges facing it in its search 
for supply diversification. However, most authors focus on the Caspian Sea region, the 
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Middle East and North Africa, and just a few of them mention Norway and the Arctic. The 
literature concerning Norway mainly deals with other topics, such as Norway’s opportunities 
and challenges in gaining influence in the EU, which is the case with the article by Offerdal 
(2010) and the same author’s report to Europautredningen (2011).  
 
1.3. Justification of the study 
Energy security is a very relevant topic today as it is high up on the EU’s agenda. Maroš 
Šefčovič, the vice-president of the European Commission and Commissioner for Energy 
Union, said in one of his speeches this year that “[t]his topic could not be more pertinent in 
the current political and geo-political context […]” (European Commission, 2015d). The EU 
has set targets for increased use of renewable energy sources. Hereunder, Germany has set 
more ambitious targets. In its 2010 Energy Concept, it sketches out an ‘Energiewende’ where 
it sets the goal of phasing out nuclear power plants and sets ambitious targets for increased 
use of renewable sources, which entails less use of fossil fuels (Germany, 2010). This does 
not mean that fossil fuels, and hereunder natural gas, will be redundant. On the contrary, “EU 
member states increasingly rely on natural gas, particularly to reach ambitious targets to 
reduce carbon dioxide and greenhouse gas emissions”, and analysts expect that policy 
decisions like that of Germany to phase out nuclear power plants, “could mean a more rapid 
rise in Europe’s dependence on natural gas imports” (Ratner et. al., 2013, p. 5). Therefore, 
authors such as Proedrou state that fossil fuels will remain the dominant energy source in the 
mid-term (Proedrou, 2012, p. 1). 
The gas crises of 2006 and 2009 illustrated to the EU the degree of dependency they 
have to Russia, and diversification of sources of supply, suppliers and routes of supply 
became a priority. This has not been an easy task for the EU, as there is a lack of 
infrastructure both within the EU and to third states, such as the states in the Caspian Sea 
region, and as this infrastructure has proven difficult to establish. The ongoing conflict in 
Ukraine has put further pressure on the EU to take steps to reduce dependency and improve 
infrastructure. In a communication, the European Commission noted that “[t]his year’s 
Ukraine crisis has put energy security and dependence high on the agenda of the EU again” 
(European Commission, 2014, p. 5). 
 The study is grounded on current debates as the EU is currently working on 
establishing an energy union to strengthen its position in this area and to further its work for 
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diversification of supply. It is an important policy area which is subject to many changes and 
threats, and an area which is developing rapidly. In 2014, against the background of the 
situation in Ukraine, the EU launched a stress-test exercise to assess the resilience of the 
European gas system to cope with a severe disruption in gas supply that winter. The tests 
revealed how and where the disruptions would have an impact, and that if the member states 
acted in a cooperative manner, the implications of the disruption scenarios were spread out 
instead of a few countries being severely impacted. It was discovered that the two main 
weaknesses of the system were a lack of infrastructure and that many of the national 
responses were unilateral in nature (European Commission, 2014b). This highlighted the EU’s 
need for a more comprehensive energy policy, and this year the European Commission made 
a framework strategy for achieving an energy union (European Commission, 2015a). 
The thesis is relevant because previous research has either focused mostly on Russia 
and its importance as a supplier also in the future, or on the opportunities the EU have for 
supply diversification. Hereunder the focus has been on connecting pipelines to the Caspian 
Sea region, the Middle East or possibilities for importing more from North Africa, most 
notably Algeria, Egypt and Libya. This thesis therefore adds to existing literature as it offers 
valuable insight into the relationship between the EU and Norway in the gas field. Much of 
the previous research to some extent looks mostly at other sources for supply diversification, 
and tends to only discuss Norway briefly as it is considered such a safe, and almost domestic, 
supplier of gas to the EU. This is seen in the article by Offerdal (2010) and a chapter by Claes 
(2009), where the authors show that the EU thinks of Norway as a safe supplier of gas 
because of the perceived economic and political proximity between the two and that, for this 
reason, is not in need of much investment. On the contrary, it is expected that imports from 
Norway will increase in the future, as claimed in the press release from the European 
Commission from 2007 (European Commission, 2007b). Also, in connection with the stress-
tests, the EU sent a request to Norway to inform of its ability to respond and to increase its 
gas supply in the case of such a disruption (European Commission, 2014b). This makes the 
future position of Norway as a supplier of gas to the EU an interesting subject for further 
analysis. 
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1.4. Approach and sources 
The thesis offers a qualitative analysis of Norway’s role as a supplier in reducing EU 
dependency on Russian natural gas, and is based on document analysis of primary sources. 
The thesis will not take the form of a discursive analysis, but since the rhetoric can give 
insight into relevant changes in the EU’s relations with its suppliers of natural gas, it will form 
a point for discussion. The document analysis will be used to examine the EU’s objectives 
and interests regarding energy policy, and to look at the EU’s efforts to establish a common 
energy policy. Further it will be used to see how the EU’s relationship with Russia has 
affected the EU and its interests, and thus how it regards Norway as a supplier of natural gas. 
The relations of the EU and Russia as a supplier of natural gas will be used to evaluate the 
EU’s relationship with Norway. It is important to note that the EU does not have a common 
energy policy, which means that it is up to the individual member states to decide on their 
energy suppliers. This makes it necessary to look at the varying degree to which the member 
states are dependent on Russia as a supplier. For example, Germany has established long-term 
agreements with Russia on gas imports, while some countries, such as Lithuania, are a 
hundred per cent dependent on Russia, but wish to diversify.  
The thesis is based on a broad range of sources, including official documents and 
reports, speeches and official statements, academic studies, and newspaper articles. It will be 
necessary to use official documents to look at Norway’s current exports of gas to the EU and 
its projected production in gas fields, including the opening of the South East region of the 
Barents Sea, to establish whether Norway will be able to be a bigger supplier for the EU in the 
future. Relevant documents from Norway are white papers and reports, one example of which 
is the report from the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (2013) to the Storting. It 
is also advantageous to include Official Norwegian Reports (NOU), as independent 
committees have been appointed to write these on many different topics, including the report 
from 2012 which concerns Norway’s agreements with the EU (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2012). The Norsk Petroleum website has replaced the yearly fact report previously published 
by the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate. 
Therefore, as it is continuously updated with information from the Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate databases, it will provide relevant factual information on the petroleum sector in 
Norway.  
To answer the research question, it will be necessary to look at whether the EU would 
be interested in expanding its partnership with Norway in the gas field, hereunder, building 
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more infrastructure and importing larger quantities of gas. This will be examined through 
official documents from the EU, such as a press release from the European Commission 
(2007b) which reveals that it expects the imports from Norway to increase. Relevant EU 
material is official documents and reports, communications from the European Commission, 
green papers and white papers, speeches and official statements from the EU. Documents 
from the European Commission are especially relevant, as its task is setting the agenda. 
Documents from the European Council are also relevant, such as the European Security 
Strategy (European Council, 2003), as the energy field involves external relations which are 
intergovernmental in nature. The output from these institutions can be contradictory as they 
can have different interests and aims. The European Parliament largely holds a discursive role 
in matters of energy security as it has limited powers to influence decisions taken by the 
European Commission and the member states, and therefore, few documents from this 
institution are used in the analysis.  
It is important to keep in mind that the sources can be biased, depending on the author 
and the intended audience. The communications from the European Commission have 
diplomatic language, and often have broad approaches to the issues at hand. They outline 
goals and objectives for the member states to negotiate and eventually agree on, but they are 
not adopted policy. A concern about speeches, is that they are directed at a certain audience, 
and are a part of diplomacy as they are used to highlight certain topics or emphasize the good 
relations between countries. It would have been advantageous to interview an EU or 
Norwegian official, as the thesis studies Norway as a supplier of natural gas to the EU. 
Interviews would provide a more direct source for views on the questions at hand, rather than 
European Commission documents and speeches. However, there is considerable material on 
Norway’s relations with the EU, so the need for an interview is reduced. 
 
1.5. Thesis outline 
The thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter two will explore the EU, and look at its 
relationship with Russia and how this has impacted the EU’s pursuit of supply diversification. 
It will further examine the EU’s energy policies and what difficulties lie in establishing a 
common energy policy, and also what challenges the EU faces in its efforts for supply 
diversification. Chapter three will examine Norway, its reserves and production of natural gas, 
along with an assessment of estimates for future production. Also, the chapter will review its 
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relationship with the EU. Chapter four will provide an analysis of Norway’s role as a supplier 
in reducing EU dependency on Russian natural gas, and will do so by examining three sub-
questions as outlined above. Chapter five will summarize the arguments and conclude the 
thesis. 
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2. Energy policy in the European Union 
Energy security is currently high up on the political agenda in the EU. Earlier the focus within 
energy policy at the EU’s community level has been on liberalization of the electricity and gas 
markets. This focus shifted more towards energy security following the gas crisis of 2006, and 
more so after the gas crisis of 2009, when Russia proved itself to be an unreliable supplier of 
natural gas. Today, with the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, efforts to improve energy security is 
at the forefront of the EU agenda.  
This chapter focuses on describing the evolution of energy policy in the EU, from its 
origins in the first European communities to the current efforts of establishing an energy 
union. It then provides a more detailed overview of the recent developments in energy policy 
within the EU, which serves as impetus for this thesis. Further, it will take a look at the 
relationship between the EU and Russia in the energy field, and how the relationships 
between Russia and the EU member states have affected energy policy within the EU. 
 
2.1. Evolution of energy policy in the European Union 
The origin of the European Union that is in existence today was based on energy policy and a 
common market for coal and steel. At the time of establishment of the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952, coal accounted for more than 80% of the energy consumed 
in the original six member states. Oil only accounted for 10%, so most observers expected 
that coal would remain the essential fuel well into the future (Duffield & Birchfield, 2011, p. 
2). In 1958, the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) was created to complement 
the ECSC as nuclear energy was expected to become a major additional source of energy. 
However, the powers of Euratom were much more limited than those of the ECSC. Already at 
the end of the decade, the ECSC started to become less relevant to the energy needs and 
concerns of its consumers. This is because it was being increasingly marginalized by the 
rapidly increasing use of oil. By 1960, coal had declined to covering only 60% of energy 
consumption, whilst oil had risen to 25%. By 1970 the roles had reversed, with oil covering 
60% of consumption and coal only 25%, and natural gas was quickly catching up. However, 
despite the dramatic changes that came about in such a short time frame, the institutions of the 
European communities were not updated to reflect this shift in the energy mix. They were not 
given any authority over oil and natural gas, nor any general competence in the area of energy 
policy (Duffield & Birchfield, 2011, pp. 2-3). Integration in the energy sector did not come 
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about, but that was not for a lack of trying from the European Commission. It has been 
proposed several times, but none of these efforts had concrete results. For example, when the 
Treaty on European Union was being negotiated in the early 1990s, it was proposed that it 
should include a new chapter on energy, though this was not acted upon (Duffield & 
Birchfield, 2011, pp. 3-4). The member states’ diverse energy mixes, and varying degrees of 
import dependence, especially with regard to Russian natural gas, has made it difficult for the 
EU to reach agreement on a common energy policy. 
As there has been no such energy policy in place, what the EU has been focusing on 
since 1985 and until recent years in the energy field, has been developing a competition 
policy in the energy sector (Claes, 2009, p. 42). Following the Single European Act (SEA), 
where the deadline for completing the single market was set, the Commission tried to get the 
principles contained in the SEA to apply to the energy market, but it took a decade for the 
Commission’s efforts to lead to the adoption of directives which opened up national 
electricity and then gas markets, in 1996 and 1998 respectively. These directives are referred 
to as the first energy package (Duffield & Birchfield. 2011, p. 4). Also in 1998, the Energy 
Charter Treaty came into force. The purpose of the Treaty is to protect foreign investors 
against non-commercial risks such as discriminatory treatment, expropriation, or breach of 
contracts. For the EU, one of the main interests behind this Treaty was to ensure that Russian 
gas continued to flow to Europe. However, even though Russia signed the Treaty, it failed to 
ratify it (Claes, 2009, pp. 45-46). 
The year 2000 introduced a renewed focus on security of supply with the European 
Commission Green Paper (European Commission, 2000). Claes (2009) uses the term 
“renewed focus” because he states that energy security was high on the European agenda after 
the price increase in the 1970s, and after the dramatic oil price fall of 1986 (p. 48). After that, 
he claims that the topic disappeared, possibly since it seemed that there was sufficient supply 
of energy at affordable prices. The European Commission Green Paper from 2000 continued 
the line of liberalization of the gas and electricity markets, but now there was a more 
politically oriented approach in the upstream2 segments which was based on the increasing 
dependence of the EU towards external energy suppliers (Claes, 2009, p. 48). In the external 
                                                          
2 Upstream is defined as “[a]t a stage in the process of gas or oil extraction and production before the raw 
material is ready for refining” (OOD, 2015b), that includes extracting the gas and transporting it to the 
production facility. Downstream, on the other hand, is defined as “[a]t a stage in the process of gas or oil 
extraction and production after the raw material is ready for refining” (OOD, 2015a). This includes production 
and transport of the gas to the consumers. 
15 
 
dimension, the year 2000 saw the establishment of the EU-Russia energy dialogue, among the 
main goals of which are supply and demand security (Romanova, 2009, p. 123). Further, the 
Energy Community treaty which extended the internal energy market to South-Eastern 
Europe was established in 2005 and was later expanded. It now includes the EU and eight 
contracting members, as well as four countries with observer status, including Norway 
(Duffield & Birchfield, 2011, p. 5). 
The European Security Strategy was released in 2003, and mentions that energy 
dependence is a special concern for Europe, and that imports are set to increase (European 
Council, 2003). The second energy package came in 2003 and continued efforts to create a 
single energy market. The package called for full opening of the gas and electricity markets 
for all customers by 2007 and legal unbundling of supply and transmission functions 
(Duffield & Birchfield, 2011, p. 5). In 2007, the European Commission released a 
communication entitled “An Energy Policy for Europe” (European Commission, 2007a). This 
document set out ambitious goals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 20% by 2020 
compared to 1990, to improve energy efficiency by reducing its global primary energy use by 
20% by 2020, and to increase the level of renewable energy in the EU’s overall energy mix to 
20% by 2020. These goals became part of the Europe 2020 strategy which was launched in 
2010 as a ten-year growth strategy (European Commission, 2015b). The Europe 2020 strategy 
has been furthered to a commitment of at least 40% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 
2030, compared to the level in 1990. Also, the share of renewable energy consumed in the EU 
is set to reach 27%, as well as a goal of increasing energy efficiency by 27% by 2030 
(European Commission, 2015a, p. 14-15). 
In 2009, the third energy package was adopted by the European Parliament and the 
Council of the European Union. It contained new electricity and gas directives, new 
regulations for harmonization of cross-border trade in electricity and gas, as well as a 
regulation providing for the establishment of the new regulatory body called Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) (Eikeland, 2011, p. 24). What can be considered 
the most important development in the field of energy policy in the EU in recent years, came 
with the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. With this Treaty, energy policy was established as a formal 
competence of the EU. It is a field of shared competence between the EU and the member 
states, but now initiatives by the European Commission cannot be considered to lack in legal 
basis (Duffield & Birchfield, 2011, p. 6). 
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The EU is pursuing a strategy which aims to satisfy all three major goals of energy 
security, namely security of supply, economic competitiveness and environmental protection. 
Under security of supply, diversification is the principle upon which energy policy in the EU 
is based (Proedrou, 2012, p. 45). As mentioned in chapter 1, the Ukrainian gas crises made the 
EU focus on diversification of supply, and with the ongoing conflict in Ukraine this focus has 
been amplified. This is shown in a communication by the European Commission in which it 
states that “[t]he political challenges over the last months have shown that diversification of 
energy sources, suppliers and routes is crucial for ensuring secure and resilient energy 
supplies to European citizens and companies […]” (European Commission, 2015a, p. 4). In 
this same communication, the European Commission sketched out a framework strategy for 
an energy union. It stated that “[o]ur vision is of an Energy Union where Member States see 
that they depend on each other to deliver secure energy to their citizens, based on solidarity 
and trust, and of an Energy Union that speaks with one voice in global affairs […]” and where 
“[…] energy flows freely across borders, based on competition and the best possible use of 
resources […]” (European Commission, 2015a, p. 2). The stress tests that the European 
Commission had the member states run on their systems, showed that solidarity and free flow 
of gas across borders would greatly reduce the impact of a disruption, and are being 
emphasized as goals for the energy union.  
When he was the prime minister of Poland in the spring of 2014, Donald Tusk, now 
the president of the European Council, proposed that the energy union should include the 
establishment of a single European body which would buy gas for all the 28 member states as 
a bloc. He claimed that “[a] dominant supplier has the power to raise prices and reduce 
supply”, and that creating this European body to buy the EU’s gas imports would confront 
Russia’s monopolistic position and correct the market distortion it has created (Tusk, 2014). 
However, this was not included in the final proposal from the European Commission. Rather 
it stated that “[t]he EU will use all external policy instruments to ensure that a strong, united 
EU engages constructively with its partners and speaks with one voice on energy and climate” 
(European Commission, 2015a, p. 21). This means that it will still be up to the individual 
member states to negotiate contracts with Russia and other suppliers, and to decide on their 
own energy mix. The fact that Tusk proposed a single European body to buy gas collectively, 
must be seen in the context that he was prime minister of a country which is heavily reliant on 
Russian gas imports, and that he made his proposal known through a newspaper article. 
Further, that the European Commission chose not to include it in its final proposal must be 
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seen from the perspective that it has to make a proposal which 28 member states with 
different energy mixes can eventually agree on. 
 
2.2.The European Union’s import dependence 
The EU is highly dependent on imports of natural gas. This is because it does not have 
abundant reserves of natural gas, and as the reserves are gradually depleting, the domestic 
production is on the decline. Despite the number of EU member states almost doubling from 
1995 to 2012, the domestic production of natural gas has declined. This decline can be seen in 
figure 2.1. below. 
 
Figure 2.1. Total production of natural gas in the EU, 1995-2012, ktoe3 
 
Source: European Commission, 2014b, p. 42. 
The Netherlands is the most important producer of natural gas in the EU. The United 
Kingdom (UK) is also a producer of gas, but declining production has led it to become a net 
importer of gas as well (Proedrou, 2012, p. 56). With production of natural gas in decline, it 
has been necessary for the EU to increase imports. The EU has a consumption of natural gas 
                                                          
3 Kilotonnes of Oil Equivalent. 
18 
 
of about 465 billion cubic metres (bcm) per year (390 Mtoe4), and has declined somewhat 
from the level in 2005 of 535 bcm (445 Mtoe) (European Commission, 2014b, p. 37, 
Appendix A, Appendix C). Less than half of the current consumption can be covered by 
domestic production. The EU currently imports 66% of its natural gas consumption, and this 
amounts to about 300 bcm (250 Mtoe) of imported natural gas per year (European 
Commission, 2014b, pp. 5, 43). The main point here is that since domestic production covers 
less than half of its consumption, the EU is heavily reliant on foreign suppliers. The two 
largest exporters of natural gas to the EU are Russia and Norway, both of which have 
exported natural gas to the EU since the 1970s (Proedrou, 2012, pp. 77, 106). In 2013, the EU 
imported 126 bcm of natural gas from Russia and 95 bcm from Norway (see Appendix B). 
The consumption of natural gas is set to increase as it is cleaner and more efficient than oil 
and coal, and therefore has advantages in regards of cost-effectiveness and environmental 
sustainability (Stefanova, 2012, p. 52). As the consumption of oil and coal is set to decrease, 
whilst that of natural gas will increase, and the domestic production of natural gas in the EU is 
continuing to decline, the import of natural gas is expected to increase further in the years to 
come.  
 
Figure 1.2. Share of imported natural gas in total EU consumption  
(“business as usual” scenario”) 
 
Source: European Commission, 2013a, Annex 5. 
                                                          
4 Million tonnes of Oil Equivalent. 
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The figure above illustrates how the share of imported gas is expected to increase if the EU 
does not take any measures to curtail the development. However, the EU aims to slow down 
this trend and has outlined several goals to be able to do this. Increasing energy efficiency, 
which is a part of the Europe 2020 strategy, will help to halt the rapidly increasing import 
dependence. Raising the share of renewable energy in the EU’s energy mix will increase the 
share of domestically produced energy and diversify the sources of energy imports, which 
will help to limit natural gas import dependency (European Commission, 2007, p. 13). It is 
necessary to point out that these efforts, however, will only limit the increasing degree of 
natural gas import dependency to a certain extent, as import dependency is still set to increase 
in the future. 
 
2.3. The European Union and Russia 
The EU has imported gas from Russia (formerly the Soviet Union) since the 1970s. The 
Soviet Union constructed pipelines to its communist allies in Eastern Europe, namely Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and these pipelines gradually extended to France and Greece. 
Most of the Russian gas is transmitted through the Druzbah pipeline, also known as the 
Brotherhood pipeline, to Europe, as can be seen in map 2.1. below. This pipeline has a 
capacity of 175 bcm per year, but does not carry gas at full capacity. The Yamal-Europe 
pipeline was constructed in 1999 and can carry 20 bcm per year. Oil and gas production 
accounts for more than 20% of Russia’s GDP and profits from its energy exports are 
immensely important for its survival and prosperity (Proedrou, 2012, p. 77-79, Youngs, 2009, 
p. 91). Gazprom is Russia’s gas export monopoly. The state has a 51% share in the company, 
which means that foreign policy considerations can be incorporated into Gazprom’s strategy. 
Therefore, the company is an important instrument for exerting Russian economic and 
political influence in the world (Proedrou, 2012, pp. 79-80). Russia, and hereunder Gazprom, 
has different approaches towards the European states, especially differing between ‘Old’ and 
‘New’ Europe. Russia considers ‘Old,’ or Western, Europe to have lucrative markets for its 
export of natural gas, and wishes to retain friendly trade relations with these states. Hereunder 
German and Italian markets are considered of great importance (Proedrou, 2012, p. 80). 
Towards ‘New’ Europe, Russia tends to use a neo-imperialist approach as it considers it to be 
in its own sphere of interests. With its vast amounts of energy exports, this offers Russia 
leverage for punishing these states for anti-Russian stances and to create hurdles for them 
(Proedrou, 2012, p. 80). 
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Russia and the EU established the EU-Russia energy dialogue in 2000, but this 
remains a largely discursive forum. According to Proedrou (2012, p. 86), this is not only due 
to the EU, but more crucially due to Russia’s unwillingness to deal with the EU multilaterally. 
Rather, Russia prefers to deal with the EU bilaterally. This way, it can pursue different 
approaches with the member states, as can be seen with the Nord Stream project. Following a 
bilateral approach, Russia can pursue a strategy of divide and conquer, that is, it can play the 
EU member states against each other and make it even harder for the EU to take a common 
stance against it (Proedrou, 2012, p. 86). Thus, if Russia were to negotiate with the EU as a 
bloc, and not one by one with the member states, is would give the EU enhanced bargaining 
power. Russia would not be able to pursue the divide and conquer strategy. Further, joint 
purchasing of natural gas would reduce procurement costs. Currently, Central and Eastern 
European member states pay a price premium on gas, which is not found among member 
states further west, and this despite the fact that transport costs should be higher (Genoese, 
Dimitrova, & Egenhofer, pp. 1-2).  
Despite its vast reserves of natural gas, Russia could be facing a gas deficit of its own. 
Here it is crucial to distinguish between reserves of natural gas and production capacity. 
Reserves is the potential for future production, whilst production capacity entails how much 
natural gas that can be produced on current investments (Proedrou, 2012, p. 86).  The reason 
for this potential gas deficit is a lack of exploration and investments. Russia’s main gas 
deposits are quite mature, and production has therefore started to decline. Therefore, there is a 
need to explore new fields, and to be able to do this, Russia is in need of investments and 
expertise as these fields are in difficult locations offshore. This is not the easiest to achieve. 
As Gazprom has a monopoly in both gas exports and the domestic pipeline system, and a 
major role in the upstream sector, the Russian gas sector is not adapted for competition. This 
makes it challenging for new private companies to enter the market and enhance competition. 
Therefore, the Russian organisation of the sector does not facilitate for innovation. Further, 
Russia’s energy efficiency is not very good. A lot of gas goes to waste in the outdated 
pipeline network, and the enormous reserves of gas do not encourage saving (Proedrou, 2012, 
p. 87). Foreign investments could offer big help in this respect, but also this holds some 
limitations. Russian law forbids foreign firms to acquire a share that surpasses 50 % in any 
exploration project. Projects are therefore only run by Russian companies, but they have to 
take on junior partners to be able to let in capital and new know-how (Proedrou, 2012, p. 88). 
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For example, Statoil, which has years of offshore experience from the NCS, was a part of the 
development group for the Shtokman field (Helgesen, 2012). 
Also Russia has started to follow a policy of diversification. As Russia is a producer 
and exporter of natural gas, it is in search for alternative markets. Russia shares borders with 
China, the fastest developing country in the world, which as a result has rapidly increasing 
energy needs. Japan also has high energy needs, as it has no indigenous energy sources and is 
completely dependent on energy imports. Most of Russia’s new gas fields lie in the Eastern 
part of the country, which would make gas exports to China and Japan more appealing. Two 
pipelines for transporting gas from Russia to China are already under construction. These 
markets, contrary to the EU, set no restrictions or prerequisites for energy trade with Russia, 
which might make it an appealing option (Proedrou, 2012, pp. 90-91). Despite this appeal, 
starting up energy trade with a new region takes time and investments, as new infrastructure 
has to be built. 
The EU’s relationship with Russia has influenced energy policy in the Union. It has 
made speaking with a unified voice difficult as the EU member states tend to fend for 
themselves while Russia follows a bilateral divide and conquer strategy amongst them 
(Proedrou, 2012, p. 86). Some of the member states have a close relationship with Russia, 
some are completely dependent on imports of  Russian gas and therefore vulnerable, whilst 
others do not import any Russian gas at all. Table 2.1. below shows imports of natural gas 
from Russia for the EU27, in percentage of consumption. Cyprus and Malta are not included 
in the table as they do not consume any natural gas (Proedrou, 2012, p. 49). 
 
Table 2.1. EU275  imports of natural gas from Russia, % of consumption 
Austria 49% 
Belgium 5% 
Bulgaria 92% 
Czech Republic 77,6% 
Denmark 0% 
Estonia 100% 
Finland 100% 
France 14% 
Germany 36% 
Greece 76% 
Hungary 60% 
                                                          
5 At the time when these numbers were published, Croatia was not yet a member of the EU. 
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Ireland 0% 
Italy 27% 
Latvia 100% 
Lithuania 100% 
Luxembourg 0% 
Netherlands 0% 
Poland 48,15% 
Portugal 0% 
Romania 27% 
Slovakia 98% 
Slovenia 52% 
Spain 0% 
Sweden 0% 
United Kingdom 0% 
Source: European Commission, 2009, Annex 5. 
As the member states have such diverse relationships with Russia and such diverse states of 
import dependence on Russian gas, they take different approaches towards gaining greater 
energy security for themselves. One such approach is that of mutual interdependence. This 
entails pursuing greater security of supply by creating close ties with Russia and thereby 
making Russia more dependent upon that member state and the EU. Diversification is another 
approach, and it has two subcategories, namely diversification of routes and diversification of 
supply. The first involves building new pipelines that carry natural gas from the same 
supplier, but that takes a new route to bypass tricky transit states, to increase the efficiency of 
supply and to lower the opportunities for politicization of deliveries (Stefanova, 2012, p. 53). 
This was the case for the Nord Stream pipeline, though it can be said that it increased the risk 
of politicization of deliveries for other states. The second, diversification of supply, entails 
importing natural gas from varying sources and decreasing dependence on one or few 
suppliers (Yergin, 2006, p. 76). Following this strategy, the EU wishes to establish 
infrastructure that can carry gas from the Caspian Sea region to the EU. This route has been 
named the Southern Gas Corridor. The attempt to build the Nabucco pipeline project falls 
under this category, as it was meant to carry gas from the Caspian Sea region, and not include 
Russian supplies (Stefanova, 2012, p. 58). Most pipeline projects are constructed by 
producers to get their gas to export markets, but the Nabucco project was being led by a 
consortium of consumer-state companies without having guarantees of supplies to fill the 
pipeline. Thus, it was certainly a political rather than a purely commercial undertaking, 
designed to vary the sources of natural gas and reduce dependence on Russia (Youngs, 2011, 
pp. 54-55). It has been proven difficult to build pipelines to carry natural gas to Europe that 
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circumvent Russia. The Nabucco project, which excluded Russia, led to Russia proposing a 
competing project, namely the South Stream (Stefanova, 2012, p. 59). The Nabucco project 
never came to fruition, and in December 2014, it was announced that Gazprom had decided to 
shut down the South Stream project (Gassmagasinet, 2015).  
The Nord Stream pipeline was a controversial project and can illustrate the EU 
member states’ differing approaches towards Russia. It was built as a direct link between 
Russia and Germany under the Baltic Sea, and started carrying gas in 2011. For Russia, this 
pipeline gives direct access to a lucrative market. In other words, it means that this pipeline 
offers Russia security of demand, that is, markets that can absorb its exports. Further, the 
pipeline allows it to avoid dependency on transit states. Before this pipeline was on stream, 
Russian natural gas headed for the German market had to cross Poland and Slovakia. 
(Proedrou, 2012, pp. 81-84). For Germany, the Nord Stream pipeline increases the reliability 
of gas supplies from Russia as the tricky transit states are avoided. It also helps ensure 
domestic gas supply when there is growing energy demand and Germany faces declining 
energy production, especially when it is also phasing out nuclear power stations (Schmidt-
Felzmann, 2011, p. 586). Poland was in stark opposition to the project, as it would decrease 
its standing as a transit state and it would lose transit revenues. Being in a position between 
Germany to the West and Russia to the East, it has different historical experiences of 
recurrently being the object of geopolitical power games, and the pipeline is therefore viewed 
as a way for Russia to exert political pressure (Schmidt-Felzmann, 2011, p. 586). Being a 
transit state offers some leverage against Russia and its potential for using energy as a 
political tool, but with the new pipeline in place Russia can take a different approach towards 
‘New’ Europe, and potentially punish the former Eastern bloc countries by cutting off 
supplies, for pursuing policies that contradict Russian interests, without losing access to the 
lucrative markets in the West (Proedrou, 2012, p. 81, Schmidt-Felzmann, 2011, p. 587). 
Germany and Russia’s relationship is built on mutual respect and recognition of their political 
and economic power, whilst Poland’s position with Russia is weaker. With regard to the 
Nord-Stream pipeline, and perhaps towards Russia in general, “[…] all interested parties 
appear to be predominantly focused on securing their national interests, with little or no 
regard for other member states’ economic, political and security situation” (Schmidt-
Felzmann, 2011, p. 589). 
The EU has thus far not been successful in establishing a common energy policy. 
Currently it is a field of shared competence between the EU and its member states, but it is up 
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to the individual member state to decide on its energy mix and to negotiate contracts with 
Gazprom and the other suppliers. Energy policy has historically been considered a national 
prerogative, which has been strongly linked with national security and public service (Grätz, 
2011, p. 61). As Boyka Stefanova states, “[u]nequal production, consumption, and import 
patterns among the EU member states make joint decision-making in the area of energy 
difficult” (Stefanova, 2012, p. 55). These varying levels of import dependence gives the EU 
member states different priorities. In the large Western European markets, such as Germany, 
France and Italy, the main priority is to ensure the availability and sustainability of supply to 
meet a growing demand. The large number of smaller markets in Central and Eastern Europe 
are characterized by fragmentation and high dependence on energy imports from Russia. 
Thus, their main priority is “to minimize the vulnerability of their gas imports by means of 
diversification of sources of supply and delivery systems through access to EU-based 
infrastructure and resources” (Stefanova, 2012, p. 56).  
The following are illustrations on how national interests have influence in the field of 
energy policy. The diversity between these countries stems from differences in import 
dependence and the member states’ relationships with Russia. Firstly, there is Germany. 
Germany has a history of long-term bilateral deals with Russia. Authors such as Sander 
(2007), claim that there is a special relationship between Germany and Russia, and that this 
relationship has been mainly driven by economic interests rather than political concerns, and 
that it is characterized by mutual dependency (pp.16-17). Germany does not want to take part 
in projects that could harm its relations with Russia, and has opposed proposals that could be 
seen to have this effect. However, also Germany has grown sceptical of Russia’s use of 
natural gas as a geopolitical tool (Rahr, 2007, p. 140). Second is the United Kingdom. The 
UK does not import any Russian natural gas. Instead, Norwegian gas covers 55% of its total 
imports of gas, and the rest stems from domestic production and imports from the 
Netherlands, Belgium and LNG from mainly Qatar (IEA, 2012, p. 67).  
Thirdly, there is Poland. 91.6% of Polish gas imports come from Russia or from 
Central Asian sources through Russian pipelines (Roth, 2011, p. 607). For Poland, 
diversification of supply is the main priority because of its import dependence on Russia. It 
wants more EU funding for new infrastructure so that it can build more LNG terminals and 
pipelines, such as the attempted Skanled pipeline, which was to bring Norwegian gas to 
Sweden and Denmark, and to which Poland wanted to build a connection (Roth, 2011, p. 607, 
Schmidt-Felzmann, 2011, p. 588). Poland has strongly criticized the lack of a common EU 
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energy policy towards Russia, as well as the practice of bilateral energy deals, which it claims 
is decreasing the security of supply of other member states. Further, it holds that close 
bilateral energy partnerships and Germany’s increasing dependence on Russia is an obstacle 
for a more assertive EU energy policy towards Russia (Roth, 2011, p. 608). In 2006, Poland 
proposed the creation of a European Energy Security Treaty to all the NATO and EU 
countries. This was to include an energy security pact, based on the rule of solidarity, which 
meant that participating countries would have to provide mutual support to members in the 
event of an energy crisis, much like NATO’s article 5 on mutual security (Geden, Marcelis, & 
Maurer, 2006, p. 24). As the proposed pact called for the suspension of national interests in 
critical situations, this was not found acceptable by many of the member states. With the 
references to NATO and as it quite openly was set out to exclude Russia, it was deemed to be 
out of touch with the mood of the member states (Roth, 2011, p. 613). Germany was one of 
the member states which opposed it and did so “[…] in part because it excludes Russia, which 
Berlin believes would hinder efforts to build greater political and economic interdependence 
between the EU and Russia” (Geden et al., 2006, p. 24). Even though the Polish proposal for a 
solidarity clause failed in this case, it was successful in having it included into the Lisbon 
Treaty (Roth, 2011, p. 616). The then Polish prime minister Donald Tusk’s proposal to 
establish a European body which would buy gas for all the EU member states was an attempt 
to establish a truly common energy policy in the EU (Tusk, 2012). With this body in place, 
the EU would negotiate as a bloc with Russia, hindering it from following its divide and 
conquer tactic among the member states. Though, this Polish proposal was also turned down. 
The diverse approaches to energy security taken by the member states, as well as the 
seemingly conflicting objectives of Nabucco and Nord Stream, illustrate “[…] that there is no 
single strategy for accomplishing energy security in Western and East-Central Europe” 
(Stefanova, 2012, p. 63). For member states such as Germany, the strategy has been to 
develop a relationship of mutual dependency with Russia, achieve diversification of gas 
transit routes by bypassing transit states, and to separate the political from economic aspects 
of the gas trade. Further South, the EU-endorsed strategy has been to diversify sources of 
supply, not routes of supply, as with the Nabucco project which excluded Russia (Stefanova, 
2012, p. 63). 
This chapter has outlined the evolution of energy policy in the EU, and given an overview of 
the recent developments, such as the liberalization efforts to create a common energy market, 
and the new proposal create an energy union. It has further shown the diverse states of natural 
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gas import dependence and the different relationships with Russia that exist with the member 
states. It has been shown that this has made it difficult for the EU to develop a common stance 
and speak with one voice. This is not included in the newly proposed energy union because in 
practice it is still up to the individual member states to negotiate contracts with Russia. The 
ongoing conflict in Ukraine has given the EU a scare, as illustrated by the stress tests. One EU 
policy-maker acknowledged that “there will only be a common energy policy when there is a 
crisis big enough to create it” (as quoted in Youngs, 2011, p. 58). However, the 
communication from the European Commission on an energy union seems to demonstrate 
that this conflict in Ukraine is not that crisis. 
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3. Norway and the development of its relationship with the EU in the 
gas field 
Norway has been a producer of petroleum for more than 50 years. From the first field was 
discovered in the 1960s and production started in the 1970s, it has developed into a 
substantial producer of petroleum. The petroleum industry is Norway’s success story. This 
chapter accounts for how Norway came to be a producer of petroleum, and how the petroleum 
industry is today. It also provides an assessment of estimates for future production of natural 
gas. Further, it examines Norway’s relations with the EU in the gas sector. Norway has also 
had a close relationship with the EU for many years, and has applied for membership several 
times, but the population voted no in the two referenda. Thus, the relationship with the EU 
first consisted of a bilateral trade agreement, and later, the European Economic Area (EEA) 
agreement became the main pillar. With this agreement in place, Norway is as close to a 
membership in the EU as can be without actually being a member. Norway is the EU’s second 
largest supplier of natural gas, and is considered a stable and reliable source. 
 
3.1.  How  Norway came to be a producer of petroleum 
In the late 1950s, it was widely held that there were not any oil and gas resources on the 
Norwegian continental shelf (NCS). However, the discovery of gas resources in Groningen in 
the Netherlands gave hope for the discovery of resources in the North Sea. In 1962, Phillips 
Petroleum contacted the Norwegian government and requested permission to start exploration 
activities in the North Sea. This was seen as an attempt by the company to obtain exclusive 
rights, and for the Norwegian government it was not an option to give a single company 
exclusive right to the NCS. If the area was to be opened for exploration, more companies had 
to be involved. Thus, in May of 1963, the Norwegian government proclaimed sovereignty 
over the NCS. A new law stated any natural resources on the shelf belonged to the state, and 
that only the King, which in practice means the government, has the authority to issue licenses 
for exploration and production (Norsk Petroleum, 2015d). In 1965, Norway, the United 
Kingdom and Denmark reached an agreement on the borders at sea, meaning the delimitation 
of the continental shelf, and this agreement was based on the median line principle (Norsk 
Petroleum, 2015d).  
 The first discovery of oil was the Balder field in 1967, though it was not economically 
viable at the time. Ekofisk was discovered in 1969 and turned out to be one of the largest 
offshore oil fields ever to be discovered. Production from the field started in 1971 and marked 
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the start of Norway’s success story (Norsk Petroleum, 2015d). Through a report to the 
Storting in 1970-71, the government endorsed the so-called “ten oil commandments”. These 
state that there has to be a comprehensive petroleum policy in place, and that national control 
and governance is important to ensure that the profit from these resources would benefit the 
entire Norwegian society (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2011, p. 5). In 1979, the area 
north of 62° N, namely the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea, was opened for petroleum 
activities, and exploration started up in the early 1980s. 
 In the early days of Norwegian petroleum, the government followed a model where 
exploration was dominated by foreign companies, and these companies were responsible for 
developing the first oil and gas fields. Norwegian participation increased as Norsk Hydro 
became involved. Along with Norsk Hydro, several Norwegian companies got involved in 
this period. Saga Petroleum, a Norwegian private company, was established in 1972 and the 
state-owned company Statoil was established the same year. Further, a principle was 
established that the state was to have 50% ownership interest in each production license 
(Norsk Petroleum, 2015d).  
In 1985, the system was reorganised. The state’s participation was split in two: one 
part linked to Statoil and one to the State’s Direct Financial Interests (SDFI) in the petroleum 
industry. SDFI is a system through which the Norwegian state owns holdings in a number of 
oil and gas fields, pipelines and onshore facilities. The proportion of the state’s ownership is 
determined when production licences are awarded, and it varies from field to field. As one of 
several owners, the state covers its share of investments and costs, and receives a 
corresponding share of the income from the production licences. Statoil was made responsible 
for handling the commercial aspects of SDFI on behalf of the state. In 2001, the government 
decided to sell 21,5% of the value of the SDFI portfolio. 15% were sold to Statoil, and 6,5% 
were sold to other licensees. Statoil was listed on the stock exchange the same year, and now 
operates along the same lines as other companies on the NCS. As Statoil was partly 
privatised, Petoro, a state-owned enterprise, was established to manage the SDFI on behalf of 
the state (Norsk Petroleum, 2015d). The maritime boundary between Norway and Russia in 
the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean has been a matter for negotiations for about 40 years. 
However, in 2010, Norway and Russia were able to reach an agreement on the maritime 
demarcation line and on cooperation in the region, and the agreement was ratified in 2011 
(Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2013, pp. 19-20).  
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3.2.  The petroleum industry today 
Today there are about 50 active Norwegian and foreign companies on the NCS. The 
petroleum industry is Norway’s largest measured in value added, government revenue, 
investments and export value. Since production on the NCS started in the 1970s, the industry 
has contributed with 11.000 billion NOK to Norway’s gross domestic product6. Thus, the 
industry has had a large impact on the Norwegian economy and the financing of the 
Norwegian welfare state. Nevertheless, only about 45% of the estimated recoverable 
resources on the NCS have been produced and sold (Norsk Petroleum, 2015i). Government 
revenues from the petroleum industry are transferred to the Government Pension Fund Global, 
which at the end of 2014 contained more than 6400 billion NOK. The income from the sector 
make up about ¼ of total government revenues. As first stated in the so-called ten oil 
commandments, a central point for Norway’s management of the petroleum sector is to create 
profits so that the income can benefit the state and the Norwegian society as a whole 
(Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2014, p. 12).  
 In 2012, Norway became the third largest exporter of natural gas in the world, as well 
as the sixth largest producer of natural gas (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2014, p. 13). 
The petroleum industry in Norway is in a different phase than it was ten years ago. The areas 
that have been opened for production, and hereunder the producing fields, have become more 
mature, and exploration activity has increased significantly. Figure 3.1. below shows the 
historical production from the start-up in 1971 onwards to 2014, divided by product. The 
figure shows that the production of oil has declined since 2001, and that the production of 
natural gas is increasing with a record year of 114,72 billion cubic metres (bcm)7 in 2012. 
Currently, natural gas comprises about 50%  of the volume of total petroleum production. 
This is linked with the fact that a larger amount of the oil resources have been produced 
compared those of gas (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2011, p. 7). To keep up the 
activity level on the NCS, the Norwegian government has set out three areas where efforts 
should be concentrated. Firstly, to increase the extraction in existing fields and develop 
discoveries that can be considered commercially viable. Secondly, to continue active 
exploration in opened areas, both mature ones and frontier areas. The Johan Sverdrup field 
was discovered in an area of the North Sea in which exploration has taken place since the 
mid-1960s. Earlier exploration wells have missed the field with only a few metres. This 
                                                          
6 The available numbers were for the petroleum sector in total, not for only natural gas. 
7 As figure 3.1. contains numbers for production of several petroleum products, they are given in million sm3 oil 
equivalents. The number given here has been converted into bcm by the author. 
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illustrates that there can still be large, undiscovered reserves on the NCS. The discovery of the 
Johan Sverdrup field has contributed to maintaining a high level of interest in the licensing 
rounds in mature areas (Norsk Petroleum, 2015a). Thirdly, to maintain a high degree of 
activity on the NCS, the government highlights the need to open up new areas for petroleum 
activity, such as the south east region of the Barents Sea, which was opened in 2013 (Ministry 
of Petroleum and Energy, 2011, p. 8). In recent years, the activity on the NCS has reached 
record levels. Many new discoveries are being developed, and many field developments are 
either nearing completion or already in the production phase. Meanwhile, there have been 
made large investments in existing fields with the purpose of increasing the recovery (Norsk 
Petroleum, 2015a). 
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3.3.  Resources in Norwegian sea areas 
Norwegian petroleum resources can be found in three areas, namely the North Sea, the 
Norwegian Sea, and the Barents Sea. Petroleum activities on the NCS began in the North Sea 
and have gradually expanded northwards. These areas are shown in the map below. 
 
Map 3.1. Areas on the Norwegian continental shelf 
 
Source: Norsk Petroleum, 2015c. 
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The North Sea is the motor driving Norwegian petroleum activity as it encompasses 
61 producing fields in 2015 (Norsk Petroleum, 2015f). It is divided into three sections, as can 
be seen in map 3.1. above. The southern section of the North Sea is a mature petroleum 
province with limited undiscovered resources. It is considered that the prospect of making a 
larger discovery in this area, which is large enough to generate new infrastructure, is small. 
Nevertheless, there are large proven resources remaining in the area which has potential for 
further production for decades to come. New investments are made in the Valhall and Ekofisk 
fields (see appendix D) which will enable production for the next 40 years (Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy, 2011, pp. 32-33). The central section of the North Sea has several 
existing gas fields (see appendix E), and also here the prospects of making new, large 
discoveries are considered to be slight. There have been made new discoveries, but these are 
too small to justify developments on their own and must therefore be connected to existing 
infrastructure. The northern section has produced oil and natural gas since the late 1970s. The 
Troll field (see appendix F) is located in this section and is central for the gas supply from the 
NCS, and will remain the main source of Norwegian natural gas exports also in the future 
(Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2011, pp. 34-36).  
There are currently 16 fields in production in the Norwegian Sea. It was opened for 
exploration in the 1980s and has proven to hold large resources of gas. There are areas in the 
Norwegian Sea which have not been developed or opened for exploration. This includes areas 
off the coast of Lofoten and Vesterålen, which have been decided previously to keep closed 
until 2017, when a new assessment will be made (Lewis, 2012). The Norwegian government 
has considered opening the areas offshore of Lofoten and Vesterålen, but was met with 
opposition, especially from nature protectionist groups. They highlight the fragility of fish 
stocks, such as the haddock which spawns in this area, and that a potential oil spill could 
severely damage these stocks (Sørhus, Edvardsen, & Meier, 2015). Today, the Halten Bank 
province, which contains several fields, and the Ormen Lange field (see appendix G) in the 
Norwegian Sea, are mature areas with large oil and gas production and well-developed 
infrastructure (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2011, p. 36). Recently, Statoil has made 
new discoveries in the Aasta Hansteen area and are evaluating the possibility of connecting 
these to the existing infrastructure. The discoveries are important as they can increase the 
value of the investments made in the field (Statoil, 2015). 
In the Barents Sea there is currently one producing field, namely Snøhvit (see 
appendix H). The Barents Sea, together with the deep sea areas in the Norwegian Sea, are 
considered as the area which hold the largest potential for new, large discoveries of oil and 
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gas. The first exploration well was drilled in 1980, and the first discovery of gas was 
Askeladd, the following year. The Snøhvit field started production from this discovery in 
2007 and produces LNG through an onshore facility. There have been made new discoveries 
in the Barents Sea, such as Goliat and Johan Castberg (see appendix H), which open up for 
more activity in the region (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2011, p. 36). However, 
petroleum activity in the Barents Sea has also met opposition. Nature protectionist groups 
claim that it would be ‘total madness’ to allow petroleum activity in one of the most 
vulnerable ocean regions on earth (Haltbrekken & Lerkelund, 2015). The fragility of the fish 
stocks are also the focus for this area, as fish like cod and haddock spawn there. Nonetheless, 
with the agreement on the maritime demarcation line with Russia, and the consequent opening 
of the south eastern region of the Barents Sea, the potential for more activity in this region has 
gone up. This south eastern region is split into five geographical areas, two of which are 
considered to be gas provinces, while the remaining three are considered to be combined oil 
and gas provinces (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2011, pp. 22-24).  
 
Table 3.1. Natural gas resources on the Norwegian continental shelf, as per 31.12.2014, 
bcm 
Produced and sold  1983 
 North Sea 1578 
 Norwegian Sea 376 
 Barents Sea 29 
Reserves  1922 
 North Sea 1327 
 Norwegian Sea 406 
 Barents Sea 189 
Contingent resources in fields  218 
Contingent resources in discoveries  337 
Undiscovered resources  1450 
 North Sea 245 
 Norwegian Sea 465 
 Barents Sea 740 
 
Source: Norsk Petroleum, 2015f, Norsk Petroleum, 2015g. 
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Table 3.1. shows estimates for natural gas resources on the NCS, as well as for each of 
the three sea areas. Reserves are the remaining recoverable volumes of petroleum that the 
licensees have decided to develop, and the total reserves on the NCS are estimated to be 1922 
bcm. Most of the reserves can be found in the North Sea. Contingent resources include 
petroleum deposits that are proven but where no decision has been made regarding their 
production. The table distinguishes between contingent resources in fields, that is, in existing 
fields, and contingent resources in discoveries. Undiscovered resources consist of gas deposits 
that are probably present and recoverable, but that have not yet been proven by drilling 
(Norsk Petroleum, 2015g). As can be seen from the table above, most of these resources are 
expected to be found in the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea. 
 
3.4.  Future production 
Natural gas is a finite resource, and researchers hold different opinions on when Norwegian 
gas production will reach its peak. Söderbergh, Jakobsson, and Aleklett (2009, p. 5053) argue 
that the peak for Norwegian gas production will be reached this year (2015). According to the 
estimates from the Norsk Petroleum website, these researchers are not correct. The next ten 
years, a significant amount of the expected production will stem from proven fields and 
discoveries. To utilise these resources is essential to maintain the activity level in the short 
and medium term. The production has been dominated by the large fields such as Ekofisk, 
Statfjord, Oseberg, Gullfaks, and Troll (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2011, p. 50). 
These fields will continue to hold importance, but production is declining in several of these, 
at the same time as many new, and smaller fields have appeared. This means that the 
production is distributed across a larger number of fields than previously (Norsk Petroleum, 
2015d).  It is possible to increase the extraction in many fields beyond what has been planned. 
Currently, there are about 160 projects under consideration to increase the output. At the same 
time, new and commercially viable discoveries must be connected to existing infrastructure to 
utilise the resource potential in mature areas in the years ahead. Production on the NCS is 
expected to be relatively stable in the next ten years. This is because new fields coming on 
stream are compensating for the decline in already producing fields. In the longer term, 
however, the number and size of new discoveries is crucial for production levels. The overall 
picture for the years ahead is therefore a combination of beginning production on large new 
fields and continuation of production on ageing fields. Thus, production is expected to remain 
relatively stable in the years to come. In addition, there will be a high level of exploration 
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activity in new interesting areas. New commercially viable discoveries will be necessary to 
ensure the continuation of regular activities in the years to come. This means that the level of 
exploration activity must be maintained. Albeit new projects are being postponed in response 
to high costs and the recent drop in oil prices, there is expected to be a high activity level in 
the years ahead. Hence, the petroleum industry will continue to be Norway’s largest and most 
important industry for the foreseeable future (Norsk Petroleum, 2015a). 
 
3.5.  Norway and the EU’s relationship in the gas field 
In the period from 1950 to 1973, Norway’s foreign policy consisted to a large degree of 
following in the United Kingdom’s (UK) footsteps. In 1956, set up against the background of 
the members of the ECSC negotiating not only a customs union but a common market, the 
UK proposed a free trade area for the members of the Organisation for European Economic 
Cooperation (OEEC). This proposal did not gain support, but the back-up suggestion did. The 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was established in 1960, and Norway was a 
founding member. Shortly after the establishment of EFTA, the UK decided to apply for 
membership to the EEC. Thus, in 1962 and in 1967, the UK and Norway applied, but both 
times the application was vetoed by France. After a change in the French leadership, the UK 
and Norway renewed their applications in 1971. This led Norway to initiate negotiations with 
the EEC, but after a referendum in 1972 where the Norwegian population voted against 
membership, the application was withdrawn. Rather, a bilateral free trade agreement was 
established in 1973 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012, pp. 45-47). Between 1990 and 1991, 
the European Communities (EC) and EFTA were negotiating the EEA agreement. Several 
EFTA countries, such as Sweden and Finland, and eventually Norway, applied for 
membership to the EC before negotiations were completed. The EEA agreement came into 
force in 1992. Sweden and Finland joined the EU in 1995, whilst membership for Norway 
was voted down in a another referendum in 1994. As Switzerland chose not to be a part of the 
EEA, it is currently an agreement between the EU and three of the four remaining EFTA 
countries, namely Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012, pp. 
53-59). 
Currently, Norway has 74 agreements with the EU, relating to a wide range of topics. 
The agreements are not formally connected, rather they have evolved over time, without there 
being a clearly stated goal for either of the parties (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012, p. 35). 
Through the Schengen agreement, Norway is a part of the European cooperation on free 
movement inside the Schengen area without border checks. Norway also participates in police 
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and judicial cooperation with the EU (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014, p. 2). However, the 
main pillar in Norway’s relationship with the EU is the EEA agreement, the purpose of which 
is to tie the EFTA states to parts of the EU cooperation, primarily the common market 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012, p. 64). The EEA is a dynamic agreement and evolves 
along with the EU, and Norway and the other EEA members have to adapt. Norway takes on 
the EUs acquis, and adheres to it just as the EU member states. However, Norway does not 
participate in the EU institutionally. This makes the EU the policy maker and Norway the 
policy-taker (Austvik, 2010, p. 113).  Rather, the EEA agreement set up a comprehensive 
structure. The developments of the EEA agreement mainly take place on the EU side, within 
the EU institutions. The EFTA institutions have to adapt to the EU, and have to make sure to 
have the same level of supervision and control as the EU. In addition to these two structures, 
there are the EEA institutions, which consist of committees where the EU and EFTA states 
meet (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012, pp. 37, 69). 
Norway is a politically stable and liberalised supplier of gas to the EU. Liberalisation 
in the gas field has been a global trend, and Norway started the process before the EEA 
agreement came to be. This does not mean, however, that there have not been conflicts 
between the EU and Norway in this field. The Gas Negotiating Committee (GFU) is an 
example of this. The GFU, established in 1986, was directly supervised by the Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy, and had the responsibility of selling all Norwegian gas, independently 
of who owned it. The purpose of centralised gas sales was to maintain a strong market 
position in relation to the European buyers, as the big transmission companies in Europe 
collaborated. Foreign companies were not allowed to participate in the GFU, so as to prevent 
them from being able to sit on both sides of the table during negotiations. Instead, the foreign 
companies participated in a supply committee which had an advisory function. The three 
Norwegian companies, Statoil, Hydro, and Saga Petroleum were the ones who participated in 
the GFU (Austvik, 2010, pp. 115-116). In 1993, the GFU was changed so that foreign 
companies also could take part in the negotiations. This meant that the GFU was not as 
discriminatory as it had been, but it could still be viewed as obstructing trade (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2012, p. 555). The EEA agreement meant that Norway had to adhere to the 
gas directive from 1998, which started the unbundling of the transmission systems in the 
natural gas sector (Eikeland, 2011, p. 19). Norway resisted the move towards a more open and 
flexible transportation solution on the NCS, and the abolishment of the GFU system. 
However, Norway had to adhere to the gas directive and therefore change the transportation 
system, as well as abolish the GFU as it was deemed to be incompatible with EU competition 
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law. To ensure open access for transportation of gas on the NCS, the state-owned company 
Gassco was established in 2001. The company is responsible for operating the transmission 
systems on the NCS, a role previously held by Statoil (Austvik, 2010, pp. 120-121). The gas 
transmission infrastructure is owned by Gassled, which in turn is owned by Petoro, Statoil, 
and ConocoPhillips, amongst other companies (Gassco, 2015).  
Norway is the third largest exporter of natural gas in the world. In 2014, Norway 
produced and sold 107,6 bcm of natural gas, and 102,4 bcm of this was exported, mainly to 
Europe. About 5 bcm were sold as LNG (Norsk Petroleum, 2015e, 2015b). This means that 
almost all of the gas produced is exported to Europe. Figure 3.2. below shows the historical 
and expected volumes of sales gas from the NCS in bcm. It indicates that the volumes are set 
to increase somewhat from today’s level over the next few years, before it then starts to 
gradually decrease. 
 
Figure 3.2. Historical and expected volumes of sales gas from Norwegian fields, 1985-
2025 
 
Source: Norsk Petroleum, 2015b. 
 There is more rigidity in natural gas trade, compared to that of oil, as trade of gas 
requires considerable infrastructure. As illustrated in map 3.2. below, Norway has an 
extensive network of pipelines in place which connects to Europe. The Norwegian gas 
transmission system consists of about 8000 kilometres of pipelines. This is approximately the 
distance from Oslo to Beijing. Most of the gas which is exported to Europe is delivered to 
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Germany, the UK, Belgium, and France, and accounts for anything between 20-40% of these 
countries’ consumption (Norsk Petroleum, 2015b). The transport capacity of the Norwegian 
pipeline system is about 120 bcm per year. As can be seen in map 3.2., there are six terminals 
for receiving Norwegian gas in Europe; two in Germany, one in Belgium, one in France, and 
two in the UK. 
 
Map 2.2. Natural gas pipelines on the Norwegian continental shelf 
 
Source: Norsk Petroleum, 2015h. 
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 Norway is, through the EEA agreement, a part of the EU’s internal energy market, and 
follows the same set of rules as the EU member states. This, however, is not the case for other 
external suppliers of gas to the EU, such as Russia and Algeria. Thus, Norway is in some 
ways in a weaker position compared to these suppliers, as they can use their monopolies to 
maintain a strong position. By being actively involved, Norway has been able to achieve 
solutions when implementing directives from the EU, that suit the preferences of the 
government, as well as being in line with EU regulations. Consequently, Norway has been 
able to fulfil its main goals for the energy policy, while complying with the EU regulations 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012, pp. 563-564). Norway has sought to keep energy policy 
and foreign policy separate. It has been a stated goal for Norway to avoid politicisation of gas 
deliveries, and to treat Norwegian energy resources, to a great extent, as a regular commodity 
in a free market. This separates Norway from other countries, seen from a European 
perspective (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012, p. 550). Norwegian natural gas is essential to 
cover the European demand, and will, according to the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy, continue to be an attractive and valued source of energy for the EU for decades to 
come. This provides a basis for continued exploration, extraction, and production of the gas 
resources on the NCS, which in turn will make Norwegian exports possible in the longer term 
(Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2011, p. 49).  
 The petroleum industry gives Norway more visibility and influence on the 
international stage than the country’s size would indicate. Hereunder, Norway has been given 
more international attention because of its standing as a large, reliable supplier of natural gas 
(Tamnes, 2009, pp. 291, 301). This is particularly the case at a time when Russia has proven 
itself to be an unreliable supplier of gas. Even though Norway does not politicize its deliveries 
of natural gas, it can still be utilized to create awareness of Norwegian interests and policy, 
and give Norway more influence in other areas of interest. This is especially advantageous in 
a system where Norway is the policy-taker and does not participate in the making of the 
policy at the EU-level. Thus, Norway’s only was of influencing policy outcomes, is to make 
its interests heard by the relevant actors in the policy-making process. The Minister of EEA 
and EU Affairs, Vidar Helgesen, stated that the goal with the government’s European policy 
is to enforce Norwegian interests and contribute to a positive development both in Norway 
and other countries. He further states that the cooperation with the EU is decisive to uphold 
Norwegian interests, and that if the their point of view is to be heard, the Norwegian 
government must engage in an early stage of the conversation at the European level, and not 
voice its suggestions long after matters already have been negotiated in the EU (Regjeringen, 
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2015b, para. 2). An example of this could be using the resources in the Barents Sea region to 
create awareness for Norway’s High North policy. 
 In a letter to the president of the European Council in March of this year (2015), the 
Norwegian prime minister writes that “[w]e welcome the initiative on the Energy Union and 
find the comprehensive and broad approach suggested by the Commission to be most 
appropriate” (Solberg, 2015). The same was highlighted in a non-paper, expressing Norway’s 
preliminary views on the Energy Union. It went on to acknowledge that “[t]he partnership 
between Norway and the EU in the energy field is of mutual benefit” and that “Norway is a 
stable key supplier of energy to the EU, and the EU is our largest market” (Regjeringen, 
2015a, para. 5). The prime minister highlights natural gas, and that it can be used to replace 
more CO2-intensive energy sources to reduce emissions in the short term. This is also 
underlined in the non-paper, as well as the fact that gas can provide balancing power in a 
system where the share of renewables is increasing (Regjeringen, 2015a). The prime minister 
underlines that while understanding that some countries are concerned about relying on a 
single source of imports, the Norwegian government does not support a joint purchasing 
mechanism for gas, as this is likely to reduce competition and is contrary to the stated 
principle of liberalisation of the energy market (Solberg, 2015). The non-paper further adds 
that it can “create uncertainty about the regulatory climate with companies and investors, 
resulting in less investment in necessary gas projects” (Regjeringen, 2015a). It goes on to 
state that:  
 
[f]urther strengthening of energy infrastructure, diversification of routes, and supply 
sources and continued efforts to make the European energy market more efficient are 
better ways to improve the situation for countries dependent on a single source of 
supply, as well as enhancing energy security in general. (Regjeringen, 2015a, Security 
of Supply section, para. 4). 
 
Thus, Norway is in favour of the energy union, and, even though it was not included in the 
broad proposal set out by the European Commission, wants to firmly express its sceptical 
views on a joint purchasing body for gas, as it could have an impact on Norway’s gas trade 
with the EU. 
The EU and Norway have a close relationship, not only related to natural gas, but one 
which spans many subjects. The EU-Norway Energy Dialogue was launched in 2002 and 
aims to promote cooperation between the EU and Norway on a broad range of energy issues. 
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Amongst these are international energy issues, global energy supply and demand, policy 
developments in Norway and in the EU, implementation of EU energy rules in Norway, 
cooperation on technology, and carbon capture and storage. The recent focus on energy 
security has further strengthened the EU's energy partnership with Norway. The annual EU-
Norway Energy Conference was launched in 2013, and its purpose is to be able to discuss 
energy cooperation (European Commission, 2015c). Also, the EU and Norway has close 
cooperation on issues regarding climate change, and the Norwegian government has proposed 
that Norway should follow the same reduction target for greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 as 
set by the EU (Council of the European Union, 2014; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015, p. 7).  
This chapter has provided an overview of Norway’s evolution into becoming a 
producer of petroleum, and given an account of its production and resources of natural gas. As 
for the future, it is expected that production will remain relatively stable. It is set to decline, 
but measures to increase extraction from existing fields, and development of new discoveries, 
can moderate this trend. Further, the chapter has shown the development of the relationship 
between Norway and the EU within the gas field, and that this has not been entirely without 
conflict, as was seen with the GFU case. However, the relationship today is more defined as 
one of cooperation, as Norway exports nearly all of its produced volumes of natural gas to 
Europe. 
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4. The EU’s dependence on Russia and Norway as a suppliers of natural 
gas 
This chapter analyses Norway’s role in reducing European Union dependency on Russian 
natural gas. To answer the research question adequately, the chapter is divided into five 
sections, and will cover three sub-questions: 1) is it in Norwegian interests to export more 
natural gas to the EU; 2) could Norway have an increasing role in the EU’s imports of natural 
gas; and 3) would it be in the EU’s interests to import more from Norway? The first section 
evaluates whether it would be in Norway’s interests to export more gas to the EU, rather than 
to other markets. This section does not take into account whether production will increase in 
the years to come so that such an development could be possible. The second section 
considers Norway’s production of natural gas today and estimates for future production, and 
whether these allow for exporting larger volumes of gas to the EU. The third section concerns 
whether it would be in the EU’s interests to import more natural gas from Norway, and 
evaluates whether it would be in line with the EU’s policies in the energy field. Also, this 
section will assess the EU’s relationship with Norway, and that of the EU and Russia. It will 
also take into account how recent developments have affected their relations and therefore the 
interests of the EU. Further, it will assess how the EU’s difficulties with ‘speaking with one 
voice’ in the energy field impacts how it regards its suppliers. The following section will 
assess the results of these sub-questions in regard to the research question. Lastly, the chapter 
will provide an account of the EU’s options for diversification in the future. 
 
4.1.  Is it in Norwegian interests to export more natural gas to the EU? 
Norway exports almost all of its produced natural gas to the EU. This strongly indicates that it 
is desirable for Norway to sell large quantities to the EU and not divide sales between more 
buyers. The EU is Norway’s closest market. To reach competing markets, which are located 
further away, the gas has to be sold as LNG. However, most of the gas produced on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) is exported through pipelines as this is the easiest and 
cheapest option for large scale transportation (Norsk Petroleum, 2015b). As illustrated in the 
previous chapter, Norway has a close and stable relationship with the EU. It is a cooperation 
which spans many areas, through the EEA agreement, the Schengen agreement, and many 
more. The EU is a stable buyer of natural gas for Norway. As a result of the EU’s large gas 
deficit, Norway has been able to sell almost all of its produced gas to its closest market.  
46 
 
It is not the Norwegian state which is in charge of selling the natural gas produced on 
the NCS. All licensees on the NCS are responsible for selling the oil and gas they produce. 
The only exception is Statoil, which in addition to selling its own gas, is responsible for 
selling the government’s share of natural gas production, that is, the SDFI share. This 
responsibility is set out in governmental instructions to Statoil (Norsk petroleum, 2015b). 
Nonetheless, the Norwegian state is the largest shareholder in Statoil, with 67% of the shares 
after the partial privatisation of the company, so the state and its relations with other countries 
holds influence on exports. 
There is a substantial pipeline system in place which connects Norway to its EU 
market. It started out as dedicated gas transport solutions for individual fields, and it has been 
transformed into an integrated system serving most of the NCS. This is a cost-effective and 
reliable way of transporting gas, and gives Norwegian gas a substantial competitive edge in 
the EU market (Norsk Petroleum, 2015h). As such extensive infrastructure is already in place, 
it is natural that Norway exports most of its natural gas to the EU. Though, to put it another 
way, Norway does not have much choice as the export of gas is mostly pipeline bound. 
However, as the EU is a large market and has proven to be a stable and predictable buyer of 
natural gas, it has been an advantageous export destination for Norway. This infrastructure, 
which gives Norway a competitive edge, requires continuous investments to keep it running, 
and extensions or new stretches of pipelines are costly investments. The Polarled pipeline 
(which can be seen in map 3.2.) is an example of such an extension. Skanled was a proposal 
for a new stretch of pipeline which was to run from the NCS to Eastern Norway, Western 
Sweden, and Denmark. However, it was not built as it was not deemed to be commercially 
viable during the financial crisis in 2009. It was proposed to keep up with demand, and 
Poland wanted to build a connection to this pipeline so that they would be able to buy 
Norwegian gas and reduce their dependence on Russia (Aadland & Sprenger, 2009). The then 
Minister of Petroleum and Energy, Terje Riis-Johansen, and the director in Gassco, Thor Otto 
Lohne, both believed that better economic times could lead to the project being revived 
(Hovland, 2009).  
 Norway adheres to a large degree to the EU’s rules of liberalisation. The third energy 
package has not yet been implemented, and there have been cases of conflict, such as with the 
Gas Negotiating Committee (GFU), but because of the EEA agreement, Norway follows the 
same rules as the EU member states. As new rules relating to the internal market are 
developed in the EU, they are also introduced in Norway. As stated by the European 
Commission, “[t]he EU will continue to integrate Norway fully into its internal energy 
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policies” (European Commission, 2015a). Thus, by following the same rules and standards as 
the EU, Norwegian exports, such as natural gas, has an advantage over exports from countries 
that are not adhering to them. 
 The Norwegian government, led by prime minister Erna Solberg, stated in its current 
strategy for the cooperation with the EU that Norway cooperates because it is in its national 
interest (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014, p. 2). The same can be said for Norway’s natural 
gas trade with the EU. It is in the national interest of Norway to be able to sell its natural gas 
to a predictable buyer so that profits can be ensured. These profits can then justify further 
investments in the petroleum sector, and help maintain a high level of activity on the NCS in 
the future. 
 The EU offers Norway security of demand for its natural gas, that is, a market that can 
absorb its exports (Proedrou, 2012, p. 83). Therefore, it has not been necessary for Norway to 
establish many connections to other markets as the EU market has proven to provide a stable 
source of income. The EU has set ambitious goals to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, to 
increase energy efficiency, and to increase the share of renewables in the energy mix. To 
reach the target for reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, scaling back the use of fossil fuels 
is one of the best solutions. However, as has been highlighted by the Norwegian government, 
natural gas is the ‘cleanest’ fossil fuel, and replacing coal with natural gas will reduce 
emissions. Natural gas can also provide balance in a system where the share of renewables is 
increasing (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015, p. 8). On the topic of the German 
‘Energiewende’, Martin Bachmann, a member of the board of executive directors of 
Wintershall, Germany’s largest crude oil and natural gas producer, stated that if one is to 
develop an economic foundation that is more environmentally friendly and simultaneously 
competitive, then there is no alternative to natural gas. He further stated that no other 
technology gives the equivalent environmental gains (Wintershall, 2014, para. 6). 
Consequently, despite the EU strategy of scaling back the use of fossil fuels, natural gas will 
continue to be a desired source of energy, and the EU market will therefore continue to absorb 
Norway’s exports of natural gas. Thus, as Norway offers the EU enhanced security of supply, 
and the EU offers Norway security of demand, it is a relationship of mutual interdependence.  
 
 
4.2.  Could Norway have an increasing role in the EU’s imports of natural gas? 
Norway currently exports almost all of the produced natural gas to the EU. The question is, 
will it be possible for Norway to export larger quantities of gas to the EU in the future? In the 
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short term, for instance in the case of a supply disruption, the prospects for increasing supplies 
to the EU are slight. In his response to the EU’s inquiry of Norway’s ability to respond to a 
disruption of Russian gas deliveries in the winter of 2014/2015, the Norwegian Minister of 
Petroleum and Energy stated that “[d]uring the winter season, utilization of the pipelines is 
normally close to full capacity. Consequently, only marginal increases of Norwegian exports 
are technically possible” (Appendix I). With pipelines working at almost full capacity in the 
winter season, it is not possible to drastically increase exports to the EU in the short term, no 
matter the production levels. 
 Researchers are not in agreement on when Norwegian natural gas production will 
reach its peak. However, according to current estimates, in the medium and long term, 
Norwegian production of natural gas is still anticipated to have a period in which it is set to 
increase, before it then gradually decreases. This development was seen in Figure 3.2. in the 
previous chapter. The Barents Sea is an area on the NCS which is expected to hold large 
natural gas resources, though these are not yet proven. As can be seen in table 3.1., there are 
an estimated 740 bcm in undiscovered natural gas resources in the Barents Sea alone. The 
Norwegian Sea is also expected to hold a great deal of undiscovered resources. These are 
estimated at about 465 bcm. From the available estimates of resources and future gas 
production it is indicated that Norway will not be able to significantly increase its role in the 
EU’s imports of natural gas. Many fields have reached maturity, and getting new fields on 
stream takes time. Thus, new fields and efforts to improve extraction from the existing ones, 
will mainly be to keep up production, not to increase it. Production levels in the long term will 
be dependent on the number and size of new discoveries, but for the foreseeable future, 
production will be relatively stable. 
 
4.3.  Would it be in the EU’s interests to import more gas from Norway? 
Norway is currently the second largest exporter of natural gas to the EU, after Russia. Thus, if 
the EU were to import larger quantities of gas from Norway, would it still be following along 
the lines of its diversification strategy? Importing more gas from Norway would still mean 
that the EU would be highly dependent on only a few suppliers. Nevertheless, it would ensure 
stable access to affordable gas, as Norway opposes politicisation of energy and rather treats it 
as a regular commodity. The main point for the EU’s diversification strategy, in the short 
term, seems to be to reduce dependence on Russian deliveries of natural gas, and not 
deliveries from all suppliers. This is illustrated in the European Energy Security Strategy from 
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2014, where it is stated that “[t]he Union must reduce its external dependency on particular 
[emphasis added] suppliers by diversifying its energy sources, suppliers and routes” 
(European Commission, 2014a, p. 20). It is reasonable to assume that this reference to 
‘particular suppliers’ is directed at Russia. Further, a reinforced partnership with Norway, as 
well as acceleration of the Southern Gas Corridor and a gas hub in Southern Europe, is 
mentioned as efforts which should be pursued to reduce dependency. As Norway is referred to 
as part of the solution to the diversification strategy, it signifies that it is desirable to import 
more Norwegian gas, even though this will increase dependency, just on another, more stable 
supplier. The same document states that Norwegian production of natural gas has the potential 
to increase, and that the EU must improve its infrastructure to arrange for the gas to reach 
every region of the EU. This shows that the EU is expecting imports from Norway to 
increase, which in turn means that it is desirable from the EU’s point of view. 
 Today, Russia is the largest supplier of natural gas to the EU, but their relationship has 
encountered some challenges. Firstly, the gas crises of 2006 and 2009 put strains on their 
relations as Russia proved itself to be an unreliable supplier since it was willing to use gas as 
a political tool. Secondly, Russia has hindered the EU’s efforts of diversification. This was 
seen when South Stream was proposed as a competing project to the Nabucco pipeline. With 
the Nabucco pipeline, the EU sought diversification of supply, namely avoiding Russian gas 
and importing from a new region. Russia launched South Stream, and as with Nord Stream, 
offered diversification of routes (Stefanova, 2012, p. 59). Russia prefers to deal with the EU 
member states bilaterally, and has followed a strategy of divide and conquer among them. 
This has allowed Russia to keep good relations with some states, while using gas to be able to 
put pressure on others. This has consequently made it more challenging for the EU to unite 
and ‘speak with one voice’ on energy matters, and thus hinders the EU in pursuing what they 
measures they want, as these will not fit every member state’s interests. Nonetheless, with the 
EU’s increasing gas deficit, Russia’s vast natural gas resources are needed to meet the 
growing energy demands.  
The EU’s diversification strategy is not about halting all imports of natural gas from 
Russia, but rather to reduce them so that the EU will not have to depend to such a great extent 
on a supplier which uses gas as a part of its foreign policy. In this respect, Norway stands out 
as a favourable alternative as it does not politicise its energy exports. Proedrou (2012) states 
that “[c]ontrary to Russia, however, the Norwegian gas sector adheres to liberal principles. Its 
function is distinct from political considerations” (p. 108). Proedrou further states that 
Norway is not viewed as a potential threat by any of the EU member states, a trait which is 
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very advantageous for a supplier of energy. Further, Norway has a politically stable form of 
government, even with leadership changing between different political parties. This makes 
Norway a predictable and reliable partner. Martin Bachmann stated that the North Sea – and 
especially Norway – will be essential for Europe’s supply of oil and gas in the future. Norway 
has the necessary resources, is politically stable, and has excellent infrastructure (Wintershall, 
2014, para. 1). President Barroso acknowledged Norway’s role as a stable supplier in 2013, 
when he stated that “[w]e very much value Norway as an energy partner, a reliable partner of 
the European Union” (European Commission, 2013b, p. 2). The EU pursues several measures 
to reduce its dependence on Russia. These include the diversification strategy, increasing 
energy efficiency, and increasing the share of renewables in the energy mix. However, it must 
be mentioned that these efforts are not pursued solely to reduce dependence on Russia, but 
that increasing energy efficiency and the share of renewables is also a part of the EU’s climate 
policy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
 The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has seriously affected EU-Russia relations. The 
European Commission stated in a communication that “[…] the Ukraine crisis with all its 
risks for security of supply demonstrates once more what the EU stands to gain from well-
integrated and well-connected energy markets with diversified supplies and solidarity in the 
face of crises” (European Commission, 2014c, p. 3). The EU has adopted sanctions against 
Russia, and some of the activities between them have come to a halt due to this conflict 
(European Union External Action Service, n.d.). The stress-test exercise, carried out in the 
autumn of 2014, was to assess the resilience of the European gas system in coping with a 
severe disruption of gas supply to the EU that winter. The scenarios ranged from a halt in all 
supplies transiting Ukraine to a full disruption of all Russian gas supplies. The EU preparing 
for such a disruption shows to which extent Russian gas deliveries are considered to be 
unreliable. The stress-test exercise did not include a scenario of a possible disruption of 
supplies from Norway. Rather, Norway was asked to inform of its ability to respond to the 
possible disruption scenarios with increased deliveries (European Commission, 2014d). In 
other words, in the case of a shortage of supply from Russia, the EU wished to increase their 
imports of Norwegian natural gas. 
 Norway and the EU share many similarities. There are shared values, such as 
democracy, human rights, and within the field of energy policy, liberalisation, as well as a 
dedication to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2015) 
states that Norway cooperates with the EU because they share a common set of values and 
because they need common solutions to common challenges (p. 2). On the close relationship 
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between the EU and Norway, Claes states that “Norway seems to be of minor importance if 
one reads the energy strategy documents of the Commission, but this is probably rather a 
result of the perceived economic and political proximity between the EU and Norway” (Claes, 
2009, p. 49). Shared values have contributed to the two parties having such good relations, 
which are considered stable and reliable. In fact, Norway can almost be considered a domestic 
source of natural gas as it is a part of the EU’s internal energy market. The same cannot be 
said about Russia. As the Ukraine crisis has worsened the relationship between the EU and 
Russia, these relations are presently not considered stable and reliable. 
 
4.3.1. Changes in how Norway and Russia are mentioned as suppliers of gas 
 As Claes (2009) stated, mentions of Norway in EU documents have not reflected its 
importance as a supplier to the EU, though this can be due to their close and predictable 
relationship. From hardly being mentioned in EU documents, more attention is now being 
given to Norway as a supplier of natural gas, especially when seen in perspective of the 
deterioration of EU-Russia relations. The European Security Strategy from 2003 states that 
energy dependence is a concern for Europe, but when it comes to suppliers, it mentions that 
most of its energy imports “come from the Gulf, Russia and North Africa” (European 
Council, 2003, p. 3). Here, Norway is not mentioned at all as a supplier of natural gas to the 
EU. The worsening state of the EU’s relations with Russia, and the development of its 
partnership with Norway, can be seen in the communications from the European Commission. 
In the Green Paper from 2006, the focus is on establishing a new energy partnership with 
Russia. “A new initiative is particularly opportune with regard to Russia, the EU’s most 
important energy supplier [emphasis added]. The EU, as Russia’s largest energy buyer, is an 
essential and equal partner in this relationship” (European Commission, 2006, p. 15). Norway 
is mentioned as being one of the EU’s most important strategic energy partners, and that the 
EU should focus its attention on facilitating Norway’s efforts to develop resources in the high 
north in a sustainable manner. In the communication on the Second Strategic Energy Review 
from 2008, Norway’s role in enhancing the EU’s security of supply is highlighted, and that 
“maximising the long-term output of the Norwegian continental shelf on a sustainable basis is 
of equal interest to Norway and the EU” (European Commission, 2008a, p. 7). Here, the EU 
shows that it is in its interests as an importer of Norwegian gas to maintain the output from 
the NCS, just as it is in the interest of Norway as the exporter. With regard to Russia in this 
document, the EU focuses on renewing the agreement already in place between them. It states 
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that “Russia will remain the EU’s main energy partner far into the future and more needs to be 
done to ensure that this relationship is based on trust […]” (European Commission, 2008a, p. 
8).   
In 2014, after the Ukraine conflict, the rhetoric regarding Russia changed. The 
communication on the stress-tests showed that the EU regarded Russia as an unreliable 
partner, and that a disruption of supplies was a very potential threat (European Commission, 
2014d). This was further shown in the communication on the energy union, where the 
Commission states that “[w]hen the conditions are right, the EU will consider reframing the 
energy relationship with Russia based on a level playing field in terms of market opening, fair 
competition, environmental protection and safety, for the mutual benefit of both sides” 
(European Commission, 2015a, p. 7). In the same document, the EU states that it will further 
develop its partnership with Norway, and continue to integrate Norway fully into its internal 
energy policies. Russia’s actions in Ukraine, and the subsequent sanctions from the EU, have 
had drastic consequences for their relationship. The European Commission sets conditions for 
reframing its energy relationship with Russia. Here, the poor state of their relations is clear to 
see as there is no mention of Russia’s vital importance as a supplier of natural gas. Rather, 
Norway is highlighted as a partner and supplier of natural gas. The EU also highlights its 
efforts to improve its relationship with Ukraine. Clearly, Russia’s actions in the Ukraine have 
left their mark. 
 
4.3.2. Energy policy-making in the EU 
Energy policy has been regarded as a national prerogative, closely linked with national 
security and public service (Grätz, 2011, p. 61). Energy issues are therefore considered to be 
strongly interwoven with wider foreign policy considerations (Proedrou, 2012, p. 49). This 
close connection to national security and foreign policy has led the EU member states to be 
reluctant to concede their national sovereignty in this field. This reluctance to establish a 
common energy policy, illustrate that the EU is first and foremost an intergovernmental 
organisation. The member states’ preference to keep this policy area, which is widely 
regarded as ‘high politics’, on the intergovernmental level is in line with the ideas of Stanley 
Hoffmann and Andrew Moravcsik (Cini, 2013). In other fields, such as commercial policy, 
which is considered to be an area of ‘low politics’, and hereunder competition policy, 
competence has been given to the European level. Thus, the focus in the energy policy field at 
the European level, has been on developing a competition policy for this sector. In the 
communication on security of energy supply and international cooperation, the European 
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Commission states that “[s]ecure, sustainable and competitive energy is of fundamental 
importance to the EU's economy, industry and citizens and a core goal of EU policy” 
(European Commission, 2011, p. 2). It further states that to achieve this goal, “it needs 
adequate instruments to act within the EU and to promote its interests in relation to third 
countries” (European Commission, 2011, p. 2). Since the Lisbon treaty in 2009, energy policy 
has been an area of shared competence between the European Commission and the EU 
member states. Thus, the European Commission has right of initiative in the energy field, and 
can propose measures to improve energy security. However, as Youngs (2011) points out, 
“[o]bjective energy dependencies and mixes still engender very different energy narratives 
between Member States”, and the proposals from the European Commission have to be 
approved by the 28 member states (p. 57). It is therefore difficult to get any concrete measures 
through the policy-making system. The European Commission’s proposal for the energy 
union only contained vague outlines of the objectives it wished to achieve. Since there are so 
many differences among the EU member states regarding energy mixes, state of import 
dependency, and degree of diversification of sources, suppliers and transit routes, any 
concrete measures to increase energy security will be very difficult to pass as they will hardly 
fit every member state’s needs and interests. 
 
4.3.2.1. The EU’s difficulties with ‘speaking with one voice’ 
Joint decision-making, or ‘speaking with one voice’, in the energy field has proven difficult 
for the EU member states. Several factors affect how the member states shape their energy 
supply policies. Schmidt-Felzmann identifies four such factors: 
 First of all, the intensity of bilateral energy supply relations with Russia, second, the 
 geographic location and access to alternative sources of supplies, third, their 
 bargaining position and standing in relation to Russia which is influenced by their size 
 (large markets vs. small markets) and position in the supply chain (strategic transit 
 state vs. destination countries) (Schmidt-Felzmann, 2011, p. 593). 
Lastly, she states that how the states assess Russia as an international actor, and its tendency 
to use energy supplies as a political tool, is the main driver for their policies on natural gas 
supply (Schmidt-Felzmann, 2011, p. 593). The EU member states have unequal domestic 
production, consumption, and import patterns, and it is therefore challenging to agree on a 
common policy that will fit these differing needs (Stefanova, 2012, p. 55). The Eastern 
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enlargement in 2004 increased the differences in interests among the member states. Many of 
the new member states were highly sceptical of Russian policies, and thus have a foreign 
policy priority of eliminating Russian influence (Proedrou, 2012, p. 91). Two main groups 
emerge in this regard. On the one hand, there are the smaller Central and Eastern European 
states who want to adopt a more common stance against Russia, and diversify their sources of 
supply so that they will not be so dependent on Russia as a supplier. Because of their 
historical experiences as weak states that were greatly influenced by power rivalry on the 
European continent, the first group tends to regard Russia as a threat (Schmidt-Felzmann, 
2011, p. 593). On the other hand, there are many of the larger Western European states which 
tend to focus on the benefits which can be gained from having a constructive partnership with 
Russia (Schmidt-Felzmann, 2011, p. 593). This group already have relatively diverse sources, 
and mostly seek to diversify routes of supply so they will not be too vulnerable in case of a 
disruption. This conflicts with the interests of the smaller states, as in the case of Poland and 
the Nord Stream pipeline, as it reduces their importance as transit states and thereby their 
stance against Russia.  
 As there currently are few options for diversification away from Russia, for states like 
Poland, who desperately seek to diversify, Norway is a desirable alternative. Poland is 
dependent on Russian gas to cover about half of its consumption (see table 2.1.), but 91.6% of 
its total imports of gas stems from Russian pipelines (Roth, 2011, p. 607). Consequently, 
Poland wants to import Norwegian gas, as was seen with its efforts to connect to the Skanled 
pipeline. Since the project was cancelled, Poland has instead been focusing on building an 
LNG terminal to supply it with natural gas from Qatar (“Weaning Poland off Russian gas”, 
2014).  
Germany, however, has diversified routes and sources of supply. About 36% of its 
consumption is covered by imports from Russia, while 27% stems from Norwegian gas 
imports (European Commission, 2009, Annex 5). Further, Germany and Russia have had a 
special relationship, which has been characterised by mutual dependency. However, Germany 
has also been made sceptical of Russia’s willingness to use gas deliveries as a political tool 
(Sander, 2007, Rahr, 2007, p. 140). Nonetheless, since Germany imports natural gas from 
both Russia and Norway, it has a constructive relationship with both suppliers as it is not 
overly dependent on either one. As Casier (2011) mentions, because of the different 
experiences and perceptions about Russia, “[c]ountries like Poland or Lithuania link energy 
security more explicitly to reducing dependence on Russia, though they are also concerned 
about a lack of EU solidarity” (p. 539). Thus, there is no consensus on a comprehensive, 
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common approach to the diversification strategy (Schmidt-Felzmann, 2011, p. 593). Rather, 
there are fragmented, and sometimes conflicting, approaches in place, with the EU member 
states fending for their own national interests. The EU member states’ varying degrees of 
dependency on Russian gas have affected their outlooks on the suppliers of natural gas. As 
Russia has used natural gas as a foreign policy tool, and follows a divide and conquer strategy 
among the member states, it has had negative impacts on how it is regarded as a supplier. 
Norway, on the other hand, as it has been a stable supplier to the EU, is seen in a positive 
light. Thus, as Norway is a predictable and reliable supplier which does not use energy to 
achieve political objectives, it is a favourable option, especially for Russia-sceptical states like 
Poland. Nevertheless, since there is no consensus on a common energy supply policy, there is 
not consensus on whether or not to increase imports of Norwegian natural gas either. 
 
4.4.  How does the EU regard Norway as a supplier to reduce dependence on Russian 
natural gas? 
In the same way that the EU is a stable buyer of gas for Norway, Norway is a stable supplier 
of gas to the EU. This analysis has shown that it would be in Norway’s interests to export 
more gas to the EU, as well as in the EU’s interests to import more from Norway. Despite that 
it would still mean a high degree of dependency on a few suppliers for the EU, Norway is a 
preferential supplier as it does not politicise deliveries. This is the case as the main focus of 
the diversification strategy seems to be to reduce dependence on Russian deliveries of gas. 
With the recent developments in Ukraine, the EU’s relationship with Russia has taken a turn 
for the worse, and not only in the energy field. It has affected several areas of their 
cooperation, and left the EU preparing for a possible severe disruption, as was seen with the 
stress-test exercise. With this worsening of their relations, Norway, which has been a stable 
and reliable partner, would serve as a better option for the EU. As President Barroso stated in 
a speech in 2008, “[i]n fact, if all our external suppliers were as sure and reliable as Norway, 
energy security would be much less of an issue within the EU today” (European Commission, 
2008b). 
However, the estimates for future production of natural gas, show that Norway cannot 
significantly increase its deliveries to the EU, neither in the short term or the long term. When 
the EU carried out the stress-test, Norway made it clear that deliveries were already so close 
to capacity that it could not significantly increase it in case of a disruption that winter. As 
production of natural gas in Norway is expected to increase over the next few years, deliveries 
may increase to a certain extent, but overall they will remain relatively stable. Thus, the EU 
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regards Norway as a stable and reliable supplier, especially in the context of Russia’s actions 
in Ukraine. Although the EU may regard Norway as a reliable supplier, there is presently not 
agreement in the form of a common supply policy on whether or not to increase imports of 
Norwegian natural gas. Nevertheless, Norwegian gas imports cannot be a solution to reduce 
dependence on Russian gas as Norway does not have the production levels, nor the pipeline 
capacity, to significantly increase exports. 
 
4.5.  The EU’s options for diversification 
Since Norway is not a good prospect for reducing dependence on Russian gas, not in the case 
of a disruption nor in the long term, what options does the EU have? The situation as it is 
today, with little diversification of sources and routes of supply in large parts of the EU, 
leaves it very vulnerable to disruptions of supply. Changing the energy mix to include a larger 
amount of renewable energy sources, will increase domestic production of energy, but this is 
a project that takes time, and fossil fuels are the dominant sources of energy for the time 
being. Moving away from coal and using more natural gas will help the EU to reach its 
climate goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, but leads to an increase its dependency on 
external suppliers of gas.  
 To achieve greater diversification, the EU has a few options. It can increase imports 
from countries that the EU already imports natural gas from, such as Algeria. It can also 
import gas from new regions. It has proven difficult to import natural gas from the Middle 
East, but the EU envisages, in the long term, the possibility for countries such as Iran and Iraq 
to connect to the Southern Gas Corridor (European Commission, 2014a, p. 16). The area 
around the Caspian Sea is a region which holds great potential, but there is currently no clear 
demarcation of exploration rights, which has made production of natural gas a complicated 
matter. The EU attempted to connect with this region with the Nabucco pipeline, but the 
member states were too divided on the subject, and some supported the competing Russian 
project, South Stream, which contributed to the cancellation of the project. If the EU can 
increase its solidarity and be able to speak with one voice, maybe then such a project could be 
accomplished. However, with Russia following a strategy of divide and conquer among the 
member states, and launching competing projects, it will not be an easy task. To further 
complicate matters, Russia is buying natural gas from the region, transporting it through 
domestic pipelines, and then sells it to the European market. This development is worrying for 
the EU as its hopes for true diversification is centered upon this region. Thus, if no energy 
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corridors connecting this region to the EU are created in the future, gas from the Caspian Sea 
region will continue to be a supplementary to Gazprom’s export potential rather than become 
an alternative source for the EU (Proedrou, 2012, p. 117). 
 From these differing approaches it can be seen that there is no consensus on an energy 
supply policy among the EU member states. This means that there is not agreement on 
whether or not an increase in Russian gas supplies is desirable, nor on whether or not to 
increase imports from alternative suppliers in order to reduce dependence on Russian gas 
(Schmidt-Felzmann, 2011, p. 593). Instead, piecemeal, and sometimes conflicting approaches, 
are in place, with the member states safeguarding their own national interests rather than 
acting in solidarity. Some member states mainly wish to diversify their routes of supply, not 
the suppliers, as was seen with Germany and the Nord Stream pipeline. Others desperately 
seek to diversify their sources of supply, as they fear Russia’s willingness to use natural gas 
supplies to achieve its political objectives. Thus, for the EU to succeed with its objective of 
diversification, it must first agree on which approach to take. 
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5. Conclusion 
The main purpose of the thesis has been to examine Norway’s role as a supplier in reducing 
EU dependency on Russian natural gas. In this regard, it has examined how the EU considers 
Norway as a supplier based on its relationship with Russia in the natural gas field. The 
research question has been analysed by exploring whether it would be in Norway’s interests 
to export more gas to the EU, whether Norway will have capacity to export larger quantities 
of gas, and whether it would be in the EU’s interests to import more gas from Norway. 
Hereunder, the thesis has examined whether it would be in line with EU policies in the energy 
field. Here, it concluded that Norway stands out as a favourable option, as the main point for 
the diversification strategy seems to be to reduce dependence on Russian deliveries of gas. 
This is because Russia has proven itself to be an unreliable supplier of natural gas to the EU. 
The gas crises of 2006/2009, as well as the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, have illustrated its 
willingness to use gas to achieve its foreign policy objectives. They also revealed the EU’s 
high dependence on a single supplier, and thereby its vulnerability in case of a supply 
disruption. Russia has pursued a strategy of divide and conquer among the EU member states. 
This has allowed it to have constructive partnerships with some member states, such as 
Germany, while at the same time being able to put pressure on others, such as Poland. This 
has affected the EU’s relations with Russia, and it thereby wishes to reduce its dependence on 
Russia as a supplier of natural gas. It has also affected the EU’s ability to agree on what 
measures to take to increase its energy security. Some member states mainly wish to diversify 
their routes of supply so they will not be too vulnerable in case of a supply disruption. This 
was illustrated with the Nord Stream pipeline between Russia and Germany. Other member 
states desperately wish to diversify their sources of supply. Poland is an example of such a 
member state, and it voiced its concerns regarding the Nord Stream pipeline, as it would 
decrease Poland’s standing as a transit state and thereby reduce its stance against Russia. 
There are massive differences among the EU member states concerning energy, 
especially in relation to natural gas. There are differences in what share of the energy mix 
consists of gas, to what extent they are dependent on imports, and to what degree they have 
diversified sources, transit routes and suppliers of natural gas. Thus, the member states are 
also very diverse in regards to their vulnerability to a disruption in natural gas supplies. The 
EU currently imports over half of the gas it consumes. In 2012, 31% of total natural gas 
imports came from Norway, while 32% stemmed from Russia (European Commission, 
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2014b, p. 44). The domestic production of natural gas in the EU is declining, and it will 
therefore become more dependent on imports to cover its consumption. 
Norway is considered a favourable alternative in the pursuit of diversification as it 
does not politicise its natural gas deliveries, and thus, none of the EU member states regard it 
to be a potential threat. Germany already imports large quantities of natural gas from Norway, 
and Poland tried to connect to the Skanled pipeline so that it could import Norwegian gas 
through Denmark. However, since there is no common energy supply policy in place, there is 
not agreement among the 28 EU member states on whether or not to reduce dependence on 
Russian gas, nor on whether the EU should import more from alternative suppliers, such as 
Norway.  
 The thesis further examined energy policy-making in the EU, and hereunder, it’s 
difficulties with ‘speaking with one voice’. The EU member states have diverse energy mixes 
and varying states of import dependency. Some member states are dependent on Russia as 
their sole supplier of natural gas, while others have diversified routes and sources of supply. 
These large differences in interests among the member states, in a policy area that is 
considered to be at the strongly linked to national security, have made it difficult for them to 
give up national sovereignty in this area and establish a common EU energy policy (Grätz, 
2011, p. 61). Therefore, the member states have preferred to keep energy policy at the 
intergovernmental level. At the EU level, the focus has instead been on developing a 
competition policy for the energy sector, since commercial policy falls under the domain of 
European Commission. However, with the Lisbon treaty, energy policy became a field of 
shared competence between the European Commission and the member states. Nevertheless, 
on the European stage, 28 diverse member states have to agree on the measures to take to 
enhance their energy security. The vast differences among the member states has made joint 
decision-making and acting as one unit difficult. Thus, there are 28 different, piecemeal 
approaches in place, in which the member states fend for their own national interests. 
The thesis has established that it would be in Norwegian interests to export more 
natural gas to the EU, as it is Norway’s closest market and there is an extensive network of 
infrastructure in place. The EU is a stable buyer of Norwegian natural gas, and offers Norway 
security of demand. In connection with the stress test in 2014, the EU requested information 
on Norway’s capability to increase deliveries in the short term. However, export of natural 
gas in the winter months is currently running at close to full capacity, and therefore, Norway 
cannot respond with increased exports in case of a supply disruption. The estimates for future 
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production show that the output from the Norwegian continental shelf is set to remain 
relatively stable in the future. Thus, exports to the EU in the long-term are not likely to be 
able to substantially increase. 
 The analysis has shown that Norway has an important role as a supplier of natural gas 
to increase the EU’s energy security. It is a predictable and reliable supplier, and the close 
relationship between the EU and Norway is one of mutual dependency. The EU offers 
Norway security of demand, while Norway increases the EU’s security of supply. However, 
since the EU thus far has been unable to ‘speak with one voice’ and agree on what measures 
to pursue to increase energy security, and as production on the Norwegian continental shelf is 
set to remain relatively stable, Norway does not offer the EU good prospects for 
diversification and reducing its dependence on Russian gas.  
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Appendix A. Natural gas in energy mix in 2013, bcm and % of total energy mix 
 Gas in energy mix, bcm Gas in energy mix, % of total 
European Union (EU28) 465,79 23,2% 
Austria 8,44 20,8% 
Belgium 17,33 25,4% 
Bulgaria 2,88 14,2% 
Croatia 2,75 29,2% 
Cyprus 0,0 0% 
Czech Republic 8,36 16,5% 
Denmark 4,01 18,4% 
Estonia 0,67 8,3% 
Finland 3,44 8,4% 
France 46,97 15% 
Germany 87,75 22,5% 
Greece 3,90 13,3% 
Hungary 9,28 33,9% 
Ireland 4,66 28,2% 
Italy 69,09 35,9% 
Latvia 1,45 27% 
Lithuania 2,61 32,4% 
Luxembourg 1,08 20,6% 
Malta 0,0 0% 
Netherlands 40,14 41,1% 
Poland 16,53 13,5% 
Portugal 4,52 16,6% 
Romania 11,72 30,1% 
Slovakia 5,80 27,9% 
Slovenia 0,83 10,1% 
Spain 31,34 21,9% 
Sweden 1,16 1,9% 
United Kingdom 79,08 32,7% 
Source: Eurostat, 2015a. 
II 
 
Appendix B. Imports of natural gas, 2013, bcm 
 
 Russia Norway 
European Union (EU28) 125,74 95,22 
Austria 6,56 1,45 
Belgium 0 6,43 
Bulgaria 2,70 0 
Croatia 0 0 
Cyprus 0 0 
Czech Republic 8,46 0,004 
Denmark 0 0,37 
Estonia 0,68 0 
Finland 3,50 0 
France 9,20 18,59 
Germany 39,98 20,26 
Greece 2,57 0 
Hungary 7,77 0 
Ireland 0 0 
Italy 28,07 2,00 
Latvia 1,70 0 
Lithuania 2,66 0 
Luxembourg 0,26 0,66 
Malta 0 0 
Netherlands 4,29 16,15 
Poland 0,006 0 
Portugal 0 0,25 
Romania 1,34 0 
Slovakia 5,51 0 
Slovenia 0,49 0 
Spain 0 1,10 
Sweden 0 0 
United Kingdom 0 27,96 
Source: Eurostat, 2015b. 
III 
 
Appendix C. Gross inland consumption of natural gas, 2004-2013, bcm 
 
European Union (EU28) 
2004 452,77 2009 500,58 
2005 536,10 2010 538,66 
2006 530,18 2011 486,62 
2007 523,87 2012 473,69 
2008 534,51 2013 465,79 
Source: Eurostat, 2015a. 
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Appendix D. Fields and discoveries in the southern North Sea 
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Appendix E. Fields and discoveries in the central North Sea 
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Appendix F. Fields and discoveries in the northern North Sea 
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Appendix G. Fields and discoveries in the Norwegian Sea 
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Appendix H. Fields and discoveries in the Barents Sea 
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